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I. Introduction 
 
                                                          
*
 B.A. Stanford University, J.D. Yale Law School. I served on the United States delegation to the International 
Criminal Court Review Conference in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. Needless to say, the views expressed herein (and 
any errors) are entirely my own and do not at all reflect the position of the United States government. All material 
contained in here is available in the public record or derives from my notes of the Conference. I am indebted to 
Diane Marie Amann, Meg DeGuzman, Judith Gardam, Susana SáCouto, and Jaya Ramji-Nogales and all of the 
participants of the ―Creation of International Law‖ conference at the University of Oslo for their valuable comments 
on this draft. My sincere thanks also go to Adam Birnbaum, Martin Guerbadot, and Nicola Gladitz for their expert 
research assistance and to Mary Sexton for her valuable and tireless assistance gathering materials. Some of this 
research is also featured in the series on the crime of aggression on IntLawGrrls, 
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/Crime%20of%20aggression%20series. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676506
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The law struggles to contain violence, whether interpersonal or international. There is a 
gendered component to many forms of violence: men commit most violent crimes,
1
 and men 
initiate
2
 and fight
3
 most armed conflicts. This is not to say, of course, that women are not 
responsible for violence as criminals,
4
 combatants,
5
 terrorists,
6
 or as aiders, abettors, enablers, or 
supporters of various forms of violence. Indeed, over the years,
7
 a handful of women have been 
                                                          
1
 The crime statistics for perpetrators of assault, serious assault, rape, and homicide compiled by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe illustrate this claim. See http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/DATABASE/STAT/30-
GE/07-CV/07-CV.asp. See also similar statistics by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus/previous/cvus38.pdf 
2
 Women serve as heads of state of about eighteen countries with Slovakia and Brazil recently joining this group. 
Only seventy women from more than fifty countries have ever been elected or appointed to serve as president, prime 
minister, or chancellor in recent history. See Equal Representation in Government, http://ergd.org/Premiers.htm; 
Female World Leaders Currently in Power, http://www.filibustercartoons.com/charts_rest_female-leaders.php; 
Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership, Woman Elected or Appointed Heads of State and Government, 
http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Female_Leaders.htm. To date, about sixty-five women have served as 
Minister of Defense. See Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership, Female Ministers of Defense, 
http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Defence_ministers.htm. To be sure, nations led by women have resorted to 
armed force. To provide just two examples, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher launched the Falklands War after 
Argentina invaded the islands, and Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister during the 1971 wars that resulted in the 
formation of Bangladesh. See Linda Malone, Woman and War, 12 WILLIAM & MARY J. OF WOMEN & LAW 297, 297 
(2005-6) (―The historical prominence of Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, Condoleeza Rice or … 
Madeleine Albright only accentuates how women with such power are few and far between.‖).  
3
 In the United States, about fourteen percent of military personnel are women. Women In Military Service For 
America Memorial Foundation, Statistics on Women in the Military,  
http://www.womensmemorial.org/PDFs/StatsonWIM.pdf. Women are underrepresented in the most senior ranks in 
the officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Only eleven percent of women in the British armed forces are 
officers. Ministry of Defense, Fact Sheet, 
http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/factsheets/womeninthearmedforces.htm. Even in the Israeli military, one of the 
few that conscripts women, ―[w]omen account for less than 5% of the senior ranks.‖ CBS News, Women in the 
Military — International (May 30, 2006), http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/military-international/. It was only in 
1993 that Sheila Widnall was appointed U.S. Secretary of the Air Force—the first women to lead a branch of the 
U.S. military. In most national militaries, women are excluded from certain combat functions by law. See generally 
ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN: DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE COLD WAR COURT–MARTIAL 
(2005) (discussing the evolving roles of women in the military).  The military is one sector of society that has 
remained steadfastly impervious to demands for formal equality (although in light of the evolution of modern 
warfare, this is an area where de facto equality is ahead of de jure equality). But see Navy Welcomes Women to 
Serve in Submarines, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52990 (announcing February 2010 policy 
change in the U.S. Navy allowing women to serve on submarines).  
4
 See supra note ___ (providing domestic statistics).  
5
 See generally MIRANDA ALISON, WOMEN AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: FEMALE COMBATANTS IN ETHNO-NATIONAL 
CONFLICT (2009); Ernest Harsch, Women: Africa‘s Ignored Combatants, 19(3) AFRICA RENEWAL 17 (October 
2005), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no3/193women.html; VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS 
OR ACTORS? GENDER, ARMED CONFLICT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE (Caroline N.O. Moser & Fiona Clark, eds., 
2010); Miranda Alison, Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 447 
(2004) (challenging the idea that women are more peaceful then men with reference to liberatory nationalist 
movements that may provide more space for women to participate as combatants than institutionalized armed 
forces). For a profile and academic sources on girl soldiers, see Waltraud Queiser Morales, Girl Child Soldiers: The 
Other Face of Sexual Exploitation and Gender Violence, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-
s/2008/1tri08/moraleseng.htm.  
6
 LOUISE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT: UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY, CONTAINING THE THREAT 120-128 
(2006) (discussing female terrorists). 
7
 In the Nuremberg era, for example, Dr. Herte Oberheuser was a defendant in the so-called Doctor‘s Trial, which 
was brought under Control Council Law No. 10 and focused on charges involving nonconsensual medical 
experimentation and the euthanistic extermination of patients. See United States v. Brandt, et al., Indictment, 
3 
 
prosecuted for the commission of international crimes.
8
 But, when a woman is maimed, battered 
or killed, it is generally at the hands of a man, be it a family member, community member, or 
combatant. The baseline vulnerability of women is enhanced in situations of armed conflict.
9
 
Even today, when violence against women is clearly unlawful under international humanitarian 
law,
10
 such conduct is often employed as a deliberate ―tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill 
fear in, disperse, and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.‖11 
Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former U.N. peacekeeping commander, testified before the 
Security Council in 2008 that ―[i]t has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a 
soldier in an armed conflict.‖12 Indeed, in a series of landmark resolutions, the United Nations 
Security Council recognized that violence against women in situations of armed conflict—a 
phenomenon that has reached pandemic proportions and ―appalling levels of brutality‖—is an 
issue of international peace and security within the Council‘s purview.13  
 Although international law historically overlooked gender-based violence,
14
 international 
criminal law now penalizes many forms of violence against women when such acts rise to the 
level of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.
15
 The most recent addition to this 
pantheon of international offenses is the crime of aggression.
16
 In June 2010, representatives 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Indictments.pdf. See also Diane Marie Amann, 
Portraits of Women at Nuremberg, in Proceedings of the Third International Humanitarian Law Dialogs 
(forthcoming, American Society of International Law), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1654732; Diane Marie Amann, Women at Nuremberg: 
Defendants, Sept. 20, 2007, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/09/women-at-nuremberg-defendants.html; The 
Trial of Ilse Koch, http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Dachauscrapbook/DachauTrials/IlseKoch.html (discussing 
another Nuremberg-era female defendant).   
8
 More recently, women have been or are being prosecuted at three of the ad hoc tribunals. See Beth Van Schaack, 
Not Our Sisters, INTLAWGRRLS, July 31, 2007, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/07/not-our-sisters.html 
(describing female defendants before the modern ad hoc tribunals).  
9
 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-113 (1975). 
10
 See Theodore Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 A.J.I.L. 424 (1993); Rhonda 
Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 
MCGILL L.J. 217 (2000).  
11
 S.C. Res. 1820 (2008).   
12
 Kate Snow, Christina Romano & Imaeyen Ibanga, Rice: Rape Shouldn‟t Be War Weapon U.N. Calls for End to Sexual 
Violence Against Women During Conflicts, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/rice-rape-war-
weapon/story?id=5364523. 
13
 S.C. Res. 1820. Resolution 1820 followed on the heels of Resolution 1325—the most important Council 
resolution on women, peace and security. Resolution 1820 focuses more concretely on sexual violence as an issue of 
international security. See generally Sam Cook, Security Council Resolution 1820: On Militarism, Flashlights, 
Raincoats, And Rooms With Doors—A Political Perspective On Where It Came From And What It Adds, 23 EMORY 
INT‘L L. REV. 125 (2009). It was followed by Resolution 1888, which mandates that peacekeeping missions protect 
women and girls from sexual violence and better integrate a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. S.C. 
Res. 1888 (2009), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9753.doc.htm. 
14
 See generally Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International 
Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 288 (2003). 
15
 See Navanethem Pillay, Protection Of The Health Of Women Through International Criminal Law: How Can 
International Criminal Law Contribute To Efforts To Improve The Health Of Women?, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 15 
(2008).  
16
 In Kampala, delegates adopted on the following definition of aggression:  
 
―crime of aggression‖ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of 
4 
 
from the international community completed marathon negotiations over a definition of the 
crime of aggression to be inserted in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC or the 
Court).
17
  In so doing, they completed a task that the original drafters of the treaty were unable to 
accomplish the first time around and with which the international community has been struggling 
for decades. The negotiations surrounding the crime of aggression focused on two major issues: 
a definition of the crime and a jurisdictional regime to enable its prosecution. The latter issue 
turned on what role, if any, the Security Council would play in prosecuting the crime of 
aggression in light of its central role in responding to threats to and breaches of the peace under 
the U.N. Charter system. Both issues proved to be contentious, on their own and in their 
interaction. In May and June of 2010, delegations from ICC states parties, as well as many 
observer states and non-governmental organizations, converged in Kampala, Uganda, to 
complete the negotiations.
18
 Those in attendance succeeded in adopting a definition of the crime 
of aggression with several important understandings. Significant progress was made on the 
jurisdictional regime, but delegates left the operationalization of the crime to a future decision of 
the Assembly of States Parties to take place no sooner than 2017.
19
  
This Article analyzes the outcome of the Kampala process with an eye toward the rarely-
considered gender aspects of the crime of aggression on the assumption that rules that aim to 
constrain violence should benefit women. In so doing, it discusses whether or not the provisions 
adopted represent an advancement for women, and how feminist theory might interpret the new 
regime.
20
 The insertion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute fills what many perceived 
as a lacuna in international criminal law that has existed since the World War II era.  Any impact 
of the provisions will inevitably be limited by gaps and ambiguities in the definition of the crime 
and the jurisdictional regime, which is premised on state consent and exempts non-party states 
altogether.
21
 These compromises on definitional precision and jurisdictional comprehensiveness 
were instrumental in achieving consensus in Kampala. On the hopeful side, the definition of 
aggression enables the prosecution of a wider range of acts and actors that cause harm to women. 
It also potentially makes actionable harm to women that may not rise to the level of war crimes 
or crimes against humanity and that has historically been rendered juridically invisible by the 
collateral damage euphemism. The option to grant amnesty for the crime of aggression also 
suggests a unique utility when international negotiators must balance the competing imperatives 
of peace and justice.  
 At the same time, indirect negative effects may flow from the interaction of the Court‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf [herein after ―Resolution RC/Res.6‖]. 
17
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9 [hereinafter ―ICC 
Statute‖]. 
18
 The list of speakers on the first day of General Debate at the Review Conference provides examples of the range 
of delegations in attendance in Kampala. See http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/GENERAL+DEBATE+_+Review+Conference.htm 
19
 See Articles 15bis(3), 15ter(3), Resolution RC/Res.6; Annex III, Understanding 3.  
20
 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836, 837 (1990) (advocating that 
feminists ask ―the woman question‖ to ―expose how the substance of law may silently and without justification 
submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded groups‖ and to ―identify the gender implications of rules 
and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.‖).  
21
 See infra Part ___.  
5 
 
potential to prosecute the crime of aggression and the long-standing jus in bello, the body of 
rules that governs how war is waged rather than evaluating why war is waged, which is the 
purview of the jus ad bellum. By penalizing the resort to armed force, the threat of prosecution of 
the crime of aggression may undermine incentives to comply with key doctrines within 
international humanitarian law that serve to protect civilians and other vulnerable groups—
distinction and proportionality. It also remains to be seen whether the codification of the crime of 
aggression will serve any deterrent purpose whatsoever when governmental leaders contemplate 
using force offensively or defensively in their international relations. To the extent that the new 
provisions exert a restraining effect, the expansive way in which the crime has been defined may 
end up chilling those uses of force that are protective, that do not implicate exigent sovereign 
threats, and that are more discretionary, such as uses of force employed pursuant to the nascent 
doctrine of responsibility to protect. The existence of the crime on the books may thus result in 
ex post prosecutions at the expense of ex ante efforts at preventing and repressing violence.
22
 
Whether this over-deterrence argument should be raised on behalf of women, however, requires 
an acceptance of the legitimacy, if not lawfulness, of humanitarian intervention with or without 
Security Council approval. Raising concerns about chilling humanitarian intervention also 
requires a coming to terms with a certain valorization of militarism and its inherent 
masculinities—a perspective that is alien to much feminist thinking.23  
 The Court has yet to demonstrate that it can fulfill its current mandate to prosecute war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide—deemed ―the most serious crimes of 
international concern.‖24 Operationalizing the crime of aggression without allocating additional 
resources to enable the Court to prosecute this controversial, largely unprecedented,
25
 and 
qualitatively different crime may distract the Court from responding effectively to the ―atrocity 
crimes‖ that now finally address gender-based violence more directly.  Giving the Court the 
power to prosecute the crime of aggression may also encourage the Court to focus on leaders in 
capital cities rather than the warlords next door, whom victims more directly associate with 
atrocities. It may be impossible to achieve meaningful justice for women absent the prosecution 
of these direct perpetrators. Given the potential to reach top political leaders, the crime may be 
also subject to abuse. The amendments approved in Kampala will eventually permit states parties 
to refer each other to the ICC as alleged violators of the prohibition against aggression.
26
  Misuse 
of this referral authority could render the Court little more than just another forum for states to 
manipulate and exploit in order to advance their interests. Such an outcome would politicize and 
                                                          
22
 Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. 
INT‘L L. 331, 333 (2009) (noting how international criminal law has emerged as an alternative to intervention).  
23
 See, e.g., SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING TOWARDS A POLITICS OF PEACE 141-159 (1995); id. at xviii-xx 
(discussing potential for nonviolent action in the face of atrocities). But see infra note ___ (citing authorities that 
challenge the link between feminism and pacifism). 
24
 Article 1, ICC Statute. See infra Part ___.  
25
 Despite the centrality of crimes against the peace in the post-WWII proceedings, none of the post-Cold War 
international tribunals included the crime of aggression within its subject matter jurisdiction, even though the crime 
was arguably relevant to the Yugoslavian, Sierra Leonean, and East Timorese contexts, at a minimum. Only the 
Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal includes an aggression-like prohibition drawn from domestic law. See Iraqi High 
Criminal Court Law, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. As a 
pan-Arabist gesture, Article 14 renders the following crime prosecutable: ―The abuse of position and the pursuit of 
policies that were about to lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in 
accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958.‖ Id. Saddam Hussein was executed before any Kuwait-related 
charges against him could either be lodged or adjudicated. 
26
 See Article 15bis, Resolution RC/Res.6. 
6 
 
de-legitimize the Court. 
 At this early stage in the life of the Court and in the absence of any concrete experience 
investigating or prosecuting the new crime of aggression, these bases for criticism and praise are 
inherently speculative. Applying a feminist perspective to the codification of the crime of 
aggression yields no easy conclusions. Rather, reasoning through the central question of whether 
enabling the prosecution of the crime of aggression by the ICC will be good for women produces 
a dizzying spiral of dialectical reasoning. As a feminist,
27
 I thus approach the crime with a 
profound ambivalence.  
II. War is Bad for Women  
 
It goes without saying that conflict conditions are almost uniformly bad for women and 
harm women in particular gender-specific ways,
28
 although the precise manifestations of harm 
may differ according to the particulars of history and culture.
29
 Civilian casualties in war have 
grown exponentially over time
30
 driven by a multitude of factors: increases in the destructive 
potential of military technology; the prevalence and intensification of air warfare; the 
proliferation of small arms; the increase in non-international armed conflicts that are no longer 
confined to formal battle lines but rather extend deeply into civilian communities; and the 
concomitant prevalence of irregular and undisciplined fighters, who receive little training in the 
law or practice of war and are not subject to a rigorous chain of command.
31
 The harrowing 
statistics of civilian deaths in modern warfare merely hint at the suffering experienced by non-
combatants in war. While women are harmed alongside men when civilians are the direct or 
indirect targets of violence, women experience armed conflict and repression in ways that are 
different from men.
32
  As Catharine A. MacKinnon has written, ―women are violated in ways 
that men are not, or rarely are.‖33  
                                                          
27
 Bartlett, supra note ___, at 833 (defining a feminist approach as one that adopts ―a self-consciously critical stance 
toward the existing order with respect to the various ways it affects different women ‗as women.‘‖). 
28
 My goal here is not to engage in ―competitive vulnerability‖ by suggesting that women uniformly suffer more 
than men in conflict, but to think about the impact of war on women as a distinct phenomenon of any armed conflict. 
See Hilary Charlesworth, Are Women Peaceful? Reflections on the Role of Women in Peace-Building, 16 FEMINIST 
LEGAL STUDIES 347, 358 (2008) (critiquing view that women suffer more in conflict and have more to gain with 
peace). See also LAURA SHEPHERD, GENDER, VIOLENCE AND SECURITY 116 (2008) (arguing that the claim that 
women suffer in war more than men is both counter-productive and empirically unverifiable). 
29
 See generally FIONNUALA NI AOLÁIN, DINA HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, GENDER, WAR AND THE POST-CONFLICT 
PROCESS (2010) (forthcoming) (discussing gendered dimensions of war). 
30
 See S.C. Res. 1265 (1999) (―Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts and 
are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements, gravely concerned by the hardships borne by civilians 
during armed conflict, in particular as a result of acts of violence directed against them, especially women, children 
and other vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and recognizing the consequent 
impact this will have on durable peace, reconciliation and development.‖). For compiled statistics on deaths in the 
twentieth century‘s wars, see Death Tolls For Major Wars and Atrocities in the Twentieth Century, 
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm. 
31
 Peter Herby, Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 835 INT‘L REV. OF THE RED 
CROSS 669 (Sept. 30, 1999), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQ3L (―Civilian casualties 
outnumber those of combatants in many internal and ethnic conflicts and have increased throughout the century in 
parallel with the development of new military technologies.‖).  See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS: 
ORGANIZED CONFLICT IN A GLOBAL ERA (2006) (discussing changing patterns of violence throughout history). 
32
 See S.C. Res. 1325 (2000). Resolution 1325 marks ―the first time the Security Council addressed the 
disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women; recognized the under-valued and under-utilized 
7 
 
Indeed, it is virtually inevitable that women will be subjected to gender-based and sexual 
violence in war.
34
 For most of human history, the rape and sexual abuse of women by the enemy 
was an expected spoil, inevitable by-product, or legitimate tactic of war.
35
 Such acts are now 
subject to prosecution before international and domestic tribunals as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, but they continue unabated in today‘s armed conflicts.36 In conflicts of all 
kinds, but especially those motivated by nationalism or ethnic animosity, women may experience 
multiple and intersectional forms of gender- and identity-based violence by virtue of being 
perceived as idealized symbols of a people or repositories of culture.
37
 Such attacks on women 
work violence at two levels—that of the individual victim and that of the collective to which the 
victim belongs. By exemplifying the debility and subjugation of a society‘s male protectors,38 
such attacks may exacerbate conflicts and instigate gender-based retaliation.
39
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building[; and] 
stressed the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.‖ See Peace 
Women, Security Council Resolution 1325, http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/1325index.html. See also 
Secretary General, Report to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, U.N. Doc. No. S/2002/1154 (Oct. 
16, 2002) (outlining the differential and disproportionate effect of war on women). 
33
 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY 
LECTURES 1993 83, 85 (Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993). See also Charlotte Lindsey, The Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Women, in LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR (Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd, 
eds., 2005) and Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 2 
(2001). But see Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 605 (2009) (discussing invisibility 
of sexual violence committed against men); Shepherd, supra note ___, at 115 (noting that the attention made to 
women victims overshadows the extent to which men are also the victims of sexual violence).   
34
 For example, a World Health Organization study in Liberia revealed that seventy-five percent of women surveyed 
were raped during the country‘s civil war. World Health Organization, Marie-Claire O. Omanyondo, Sexual 
Gender-Based Violence And Health Facility Needs Assessment (Montserrado And Bong Counties) Liberia (Sept. 6 - 
21, 2004), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_GBV_2004_FINAL.pdf. Statistics suggest that 40,000 women 
were raped during war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1990s.  In Sierra Leone, combatants sexually assaulted 
between 50,000-64,000 internally displaced women in Sierra Leone.  See U.N. Family Planning Association, Sexual 
Violence Against Women and Girls in War and Its Aftermath: Realities, Responses and Required Resources, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/symposium06/docs/finalbrusselsbriefingpaper.pdf. See generally 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1820 (2008), U.N. Doc. S/2009/362 (July 
15, 2009); Congressional Research Service, Alexis Arieff, Sexual Violence in African Contexts (Nov. 25, 2009), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40956.pdf.  
35
 Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: War On Women, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT‘L L. 33 (2000) (recounting the 
invisibility of violence against women until the establishment of the ad hoc criminal tribunals in the 1990s). 
36
 The statistics from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a third world war is raging, are harrowing. See 
World Health Organization, Responding to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, available at http://www.who.int/hac/crises/countries/cod/2pager.pdf; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative & 
Oxfam Int‘l, “Now, The World Is Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (April 2010), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/sexual-
violence-drc.html. An average of forty women are raped every day in South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. See Stop Rape Now, Security Council Resolution 1820: Women, Peace & Security, available at 
http://www.stoprapenow.org/pdf/Security%20Council%20Resolution%201820.pdf. 
37
 Wars of national liberation are rarely liberating for women, especially when women are asked to subordinate their 
demands to the demands of their polity. See generally Christine Chinkin, A Gendered Perspective to the 
International Use of Force, 12 AUSTR. Y.B. INT‘L L. 279, 285 (1988-89).  
38
 Brownmiller, supra note ___, at 38 (noting that the ―body of a raped women becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a 
parade ground for the victor‘s trooping of the colors. The act that is played out upon her [is] vivid proof of victory 
for one and loss and defeat for the other.‖).  
39
 Doris Buss, Rethinking Rape as a Weapon of War, 17 FEM. LEG. STUDIES 145, 148 (2009) [hereinafter ―Buss, 
Rethinking‖] (noting that the reciprocal rapes in war constitute a message of victory or defeat passed between men). 
8 
 
Violence against women in war does not come only from military opponents. In wars of 
liberation, women may join, or be forcibly conscripted into, rebel armies in which they may 
serve as combatants,
40
 domestic servants, spies, sexual slaves, and ―bush wives.‖41 History has 
shown that peacekeepers are not necessarily the benign protectors they are deployed to be.
42
  In 
addition, women often experience the time of war as an extension of a pre-existing ―peacetime‖ 
continuum of violence in which they experience wrongs such as intimate violence, sexual 
harassment, and other forms of private or communal violence.
43
 Many forms of this everyday 
violent behavior are exacerbated in wartime.
44
 When societies are under stress, the rule of law is 
shattered, and cruelty becomes normalized if not legitimated.
45
 These multifarious sources of 
violence against women hold entire communities hostage and prevent women‘s full access to 
schools, markets, social services, and other necessities of life.
46
 
War also harms women in nonviolent ways too. Militarism in general—and war in 
particular—consumes resources that might otherwise go to different priorities of the state, such 
as education, healthcare, and improving the societal infrastructure.
47
 As detailed in a recent study 
of gender and war,
48
 it cannot be gainsaid that some women may enjoy some economic benefits 
during a conflict. For example, in the mythic tradition of Rosie the Riveter, they may be invited 
to fill positions vacated by men. Yet due to their second class citizenship and lack of enforceable 
legal rights, women cannot fully capitalize on the black and grey markets that replace formal 
markets in war.
49
 Moreover, they are often reduced to becoming camp-followers to survive,
50
 
dependent on false and temporary conflict economies that offer marginalized employment as 
cooks, housekeepers, and runners. Their employers frequently extract paid or unpaid sexual 
exploitation.
51
   
                                                          
40
 For a study in Liberia, see Kirsten Johnson, et al., Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With 
Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia, 300, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 676 (2008), available at 
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/300/6/676 (noting that one-third of former combatants were women, one-
fourth of whom participated in combat). 
41
 See generally CHRIS COULTER, BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN‘S LIVES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN 
SIERRA LEONE (2009) (detailing the informal survival relationships entered into by women during the armed conflict 
in Sierra Leone). 
42
 See generally Muno Ndulo, The United Nations Repsonses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and 
Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L 127 (2009) (detailing abuses by 
peacekeepers). See also S.C. Res. 1888 (2009) (calling for more women to be deployed in peacekeeping operations). 
43
 See Report of the Secretary-General, In Depth Study of All Forms of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. No 
A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20A61122Add1.pdf.  See also Buss, Rethinking, at 145 (arguing that the 
hypervisibility of wartime sexual violence renders other forms of violence against women invisible); THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Rozanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
44
 Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Gender, Masculinities and Transition in Conflicted Societies, 44 NEW ENGL. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
45
 Chinkin, supra note ___, at 255.  
46
 Cook, supra note____, at 128.  
47
 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note ___, at 166.  
48
 Cahn & Ní Aoláin, supra note ___.  
49
 Id.  
50
 Id. at 3. 
51
 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008) (acknowledging crime against 
humanity of forced marriage). 
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The aftermath of armed conflicts does not necessarily bring relief. Women and children 
make up the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons,
52
 many of whom are fleeing 
the world‘s armed conflicts. Once some measure of peace is achieved, women are often pushed 
into traditional gender roles in a collective effort to return to a condition of ―normalcy‖ (unless  
they are ostracized for having been raped or for their affiliation with combatants during the war). 
Levels of gender-based violence may remain high in the immediate post-conflict period as 
combatants are demobilized and resocialized to conditions of peace
53
 and as men reassert the 
patriarchal control mechanisms that may have eroded or been suspended during the conflict. As 
the African proverb entitling this piece suggests,
54
 war—its destructiveness, its culture of 
hypermasculinity, and its deep societal consequences—is bad for women as civilians but also for 
women as women.  
III. Deconstructing the Crime of Aggression 
 
The codification of the crime of aggression and its complex jurisdictional regime is one 
potential response to the truism that war is bad for women. The definition of the crime of 
aggression and its jurisdictional regime contain several notable features in need of a careful 
deconstruction. The descriptive material in this part will serve as the basis for the gendered 
analysis that follows.   
 
A. Acts of Aggression and Crimes of Aggression 
 
The definition of the crime of aggression will be inserted within the Rome Statute as 
Article 8bis, just following the war crimes provisions that comprise Article 8.
55
 The crime of 
aggression has been defined as follows:  
 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ―crime of aggression‖ means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ―act of aggression‖ means the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
                                                          
52
 Women represent very close to half of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees ―persons of concern‖, 
which includes refugees, internally displaced persons, and stateless persons. Forty-five percent are children.  
UNHCR, 2009 GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND 
STATELESS PERSONS 14 (June 15, 2010).   
53
 Kimberly Theidon, Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of 
Former Combatants in Colombia, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2009); Cahn & Ní Aoláin, supra note ___ at 18 n.47.  
54
 The title of this article is derived from an African proverb: ―When elephants fight the grass gets hurt.‖ See 
Afriprov.org, African Proverb of the Month (November 2001), http://www.afriprov.org/index.php/african-proverb-
of-the-month/27-2001proverbs/172-nov2001.html. 
55
 The aggression amendments have been denominated Article 8bis (definition), Articles 15bis and 15ter 
(jurisdiction), and Article 25(3) (the leadership clause). All other Articles referenced herein appear within the ICC 
Statute as adopted at Rome in 1998.  
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another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify 
as an act of aggression.
56
 
 
The definition then goes on to provide a list of ―acts of aggression‖ (such as invasion, 
bombardment, etc.),
57
 which are drawn verbatim from Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution 
3314
58
 drafted in 1974 to guide the Security Council in determining, in accordance with the U.N. 
Charter, the existence of an act of aggression.
59
  
                                                          
56
 Article 8bis, Resolution RC/Res.6. The Elements of Crimes are as follows: 
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression. 
2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of the State which committed the act of aggression. 
3. The act of aggression—the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations—was committed. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a use of armed force was 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
Id. at Annex II. The Elements of Crime are meant to ―assist the Court in the interpretation and application of‖ the 
crimes within its jurisdiction. See Article 9, ICC Statute.  
57
 These acts are: 
 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military 
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of 
force of the territory of another State or part thereof;  
 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any 
weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;  
 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another 
State;  
 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement 
of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of 
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;  
 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be 
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry 
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein.  
Id. at Article 8bis(2). 
58
 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). Other aspects of that Resolution are not 
reproduced in the aggression amendments, such as the recognition that acts of aggression constitute the ―most 
serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force‖ (Preamble) and that the Security Council may decline to 
declare an act of aggression notwithstanding the commission of an enumerated act (Article 2). It is unclear if this list 
11 
 
The amendment to the Rome Statute that drafters designated Article 8bis defines two 
phenomena: a crime of aggression, set out in subsection 1 of the Article 8bis, and an act of 
aggression, set out in subsection 2. These two inquiries are considered in reverse order. The act 
of aggression committed by a state serves as a predicate for the prosecution of an individual for 
the crime of aggression. Thus, an individual will be held liable when he or she plans, prepares, 
initiates, or executes one or more acts of aggression through the machinery of a state. The 
enumerated acts of aggression reflect their historical origins; absent are acts that might be 
considered contemporary forms of aggression, such as embargos, cyber attacks or deliberately 
inflicted environmental degradation, although such acts may be assimilated into the provisions 
adopted.
60
  
Like General Assembly Resolution 3314, which preceded it, various draft definitions of 
the crime of aggression were consistently state-centric; specifically, they envisioned acts of 
aggression as phenomena of states, formal military organizations, and international borders.
61
 
That said, one of the amendments adopted at Kampala, Article 8bis(2)(g), may facilitate 
prosecutions for aggression in ostensibly non-international conflicts by designating the sending 
of armed bands into another state to carry out acts of armed force as a prosecutable act of 
aggression. In addition, although the amendments do not address the question directly, it is 
foreseeable that standard principles of attribution and state responsibility could be applied in a 
way that extends the reach of the prohibition and satisfies the jurisdictional precondition of state 
action.
62
  
 
B. The Jurisdictional Regime 
 
Delegates adopted a two-tiered filter structure for undertaking the determination of 
whether a state committed an act of aggression. The operation of the filter depends on the source 
of the referral of the situation in question.
63
 When an investigation is triggered either by a state 
party referral or by the prosecutor acting proprio motu, pursuant to Articles 13(a) and (c) of the 
Statute respectively, efforts to prosecute the crime will be subject to two filters operating in 
tandem.
64
 Pursuant to the new Article 15bis(6), the prosecutor will first determine whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is exhaustive. See Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 
8(5) J. OF INT‘L CRIM. JUSTICE 1179, 1191 (2010) (suggesting that other forms of state conduct might also qualify as 
acts of aggression and opining that other aspects of Resolution 3314 may be relevant to the aggression inquiry). 
59
 In 1967, the General Assembly delegated the task of defining aggression to a U.N. Special Committee on the 
Question of Defining Aggression, which was composed of thirty-five members chosen for their geographic and legal 
diversity. It took seven sessions of the Special Committee for the Committee to come up with a consensus definition 
that it could recommend to the General Assembly for adoption. Resolution 3314 was adopted by consensus, an 
amazing feat given its Cold War provenance. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus 
Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Substance, 10 J. OF INT‘L L. & ECON. 701 (1975) (detailing history of Resolution 
3314).  
60
 In the negotiations, the need to prove an act of state in connection with an aggression prosecution gave rise to 
extensive negotiations over which body—the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of 
Justice, or the Court itself—would be empowered to make the predicate determination. 
61
 See Barriga, supra note  ___ (setting forth draft definitions of aggression). 
62
 See infra note __ (discussing applicable standards).  
63
 See Article 15bis and 15ter of Resolution RC/Res.6. 
64
 Article 15bis of Resolution RC/Res.6 reads:  
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Security Council has made a determination as to whether the putative aggressor state has 
committed an act of aggression. If so, the prosecutor will be entitled to include aggression 
charges in the indictment pursuant to Article 15bis(7) of the amendments. The Security 
Council‘s determination is not binding on the Court,65 which will determine the existence of an 
act of aggression anew under the terms of the Statute and the beyond-reasonable-doubt burden of 
proof.
66
 The Council‘s determination, however, will undoubtedly exert a considerable 
evidentiary pull at trial. If, on the other hand, the Council has not made the necessary 
determination in six months, the prosecutor can request permission from the Pre-Trial Division 
(composed of all the pre-trial judges) to bring such charges pursuant to the new Article 15bis(8). 
This request is subject to the procedures set out in Article 15 of the Statute—the same provision 
that governs the Prosecutor‘s request to launch an investigation proprio motu.  Investigations 
triggered by the Security Council pursuant to Article 13(b) are not subject to any filter within 
Article 15ter of the amendments. Following the activation of any of the three trigger 
mechanisms, the Security Council may exercise authority under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, 
and adopt a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to defer the case for a 
renewable period of one year.
67
 
The crime of aggression may not be prosecuted pursuant to a state referral or proprio 
motu investigation in situations involving states that are not party to the ICC Statute. According 
to Article 15bis(5): ―In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State‘s nationals or 
on its territory.‖ This blanket exclusion arguably applies to both aggressor and aggressed states.  
In addition, pursuant to Article 15bis(4), states parties can choose to opt out of the aggression 
provisions prior to their ratification or acceptance of the aggression amendments.
68
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13, 
paragraphs (a) and (c), subject to the provisions of this article. … 
 
6. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in 
respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a 
determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant 
information and documents. 
 
7. Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.  
 
8. Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the Prosecutor may 
proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has 
authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with 
the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in accordance 
with article 16. 
 
Article 15bis, Resolution RC/Res.6.  
65
 Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15bis(9)(―A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court 
shall be without prejudice to the Court‘s own findings under this Statute.‖).  
66
 ICC Statute, Article 66. 
67
 Article 16, ICC Statute.  
68
 That provision reads: ―The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously 
declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal of such 
a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the State Party within three years.‖ 
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C. The Gravity Threshold Applicable to the Act of Aggression Determination 
 
Article 8bis(2) is worded in such a way
69
 that an act of aggression encompasses any 
violation of the territorial integrity, political independence, or sovereignty of another state as 
well as any use of armed force that is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.
70
 Accordingly, the mere 
crossing of an international border by military forces without the consent of the neighboring 
state, for example, could be condemned an act of aggression regardless of the circumstances, the 
consequences of the state‘s actions, or the motive or intent behind the operation.71 Such an act 
could then serve as the predicate to a prosecution for the crime of aggression, if the act satisfies 
the requirements set forth in Article 8bis(1).   
Although the statutory language is quite broad, and makes no express reference to 
codified or uncodified exceptions to the Charter‘s prohibition on the use of armed force, the new 
Elements of Crime for aggression clarify that only breaches of the Charter constitute acts of 
aggression.
72
 In addition, understandings adopted in connection with the aggression amendments 
make clear that a gravity threshold applies to the preliminary determination of the existence of an 
act of aggression by the Security Council or Pre-Trial Division.
73
 
 
D. The Leadership Clause 
 
                                                          
69
 Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 8bis(2) (defining ―act of aggression‖ as ―the use of armed force by a State against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations‖). 
70
 This language, with the exception of the added reference to ―sovereignty‖ and the deletion of the concept of a 
threat to the peace, is drawn from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (―All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.‖). 
71
 Although it may be argued that the reference to consistency with the Charter might prevent a bona fide 
humanitarian intervention or act of self-defense from being considered an act of aggression, the ―any other manner‖ 
language technically qualifies ―the use of armed force‖ and not ―sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence.‖ This ―any other manner‖ language thus appears to broaden, rather than narrow, the prohibition 
contained in both Articles 2(4) of the Charter and Article 8bis. 
72
 The fourth element of the crime of aggression dictates that ―[t]he perpetrator was aware of the factual 
circumstances that established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations.‖ Resolution RC/Res.6 at 5. 
73
 Understandings 6 and 7 clarify the methodology for determining the existence of an act of aggression: 
 
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of 
force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires 
consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the  gravity of the acts 
concerned and their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
7. It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be 
sufficient to justify a ―manifest‖ determination. No one component can be significant enough to 
satisfy the manifest standard by itself. 
 
Res 6, Annex III.   
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Once the determination has been made that an act of aggression has been committed, the 
analysis shifts to determine whether a crime of aggression has been committed. The crime of 
aggression is subject to a leadership clause, which provides that only those individuals occupying 
the top policy-making echelons of a military or civilian hierarchy
74
 can be prosecuted for the 
crime of aggression.
75
 A footnote to the corresponding Elements of Crimes makes clear that 
more than one person may be criminally liable for a particular act of aggression.
76
  The crime of 
aggression will be subject to all the forms of responsibility set forth in Article 25.
77
  
 
E. Mens Rea 
 
In terms of mens rea, the first element of the crime is a conduct element subject to a 
heightened mental state of intent according to the Elements of Crimes. Subsequent circumstantial 
elements, such as the defendant‘s occupation of a leadership position, are subject to the lower 
mental state of knowledge.
78
 This formulation seems to exclude a constructive knowledge, or 
―should have known,‖ standard.  The elements of the crime encompassing the commission of an 
act of aggression in manifest violation of the Charter is subject to ―knowledge of fact‖ mental 
state, which requires a showing that the defendant was aware of the factual circumstances that 
rendered the applicable state‘s use of force inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.79 The perpetrator 
is not required to have knowledge of the precise legal doctrines governing uses of force.
80
  
                                                          
74
 A similar approach was taken in the post-WWII period when tribunals convicted only those individuals at the 
policy-making level. See, e.g., United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 462, 488 
(1949) (holding that defendants must ―be in a position to shape or influence the policy that brings about [the] 
initiation or … continuation‖ of an aggressive war). This excluded ―commanders and staff officers below the policy 
level responsible for planning campaigns, preparing means for carrying them out, moving against a country on 
orders and fighting a war after it has been instituted.‖ Id. at 490-91. Individuals deemed ―policy makers‖ included 
civilian industrials with considerable influence over the government. United States v. Krauch (I.G. Farben), 8 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 
10 1081, 1124-5 (1949) (―To depart from the concept that only major war criminals—that is, those persons in the 
political, military and industrial fields, for example, who were responsible for the formulation and execution of 
policies—may be held liable for waging wars of aggression, would lead far afield. Under such circumstances there 
could be no practical limitation on criminal responsibility that would not include, on principle, the private soldier on 
the battlefield, the farmer who increased his production of foodstuffs to sustain the armed forces…‖). 
75
 The text, ―In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply only to persons in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State‖ will be inserted 
after Article 25, paragraph 3 of the Statute. Resolution RC/Res.6, Foot soldiers will not be subject to such charges 
before the ICC; however, they can still be prosecuted pursuant to Article 8 of the Rome Statute for any war crimes 
committed in connection with an act of aggression. The Rome Statute abrogates all immunities at Article 27.  
76
 Footnote 1 reads: ―With respect to an act of aggression, more than one person may be in a position that meets 
these criteria.‖ Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note __.  
77
 Although there had been some discussion about identifying separate forms of responsibility applicable only to the 
crime of aggression, this proposal was not pursued. See Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years In The Making: The Definition of 
Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 548-9 (2008) 
(recounting forms of responsibility options). 
78
 By the terms of Article 30(3) of the Rome Statute, knowledge ―means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.‖ Article 30, ICC Statute. 
79
 These include the occurrence of an armed attack against another state, the absence of Security Council 
authorization, and the absence of a prior attack by the putative victim state. 
80
 A similar knowledge-of-fact formulation is contained in Article 8 of the ICC Statute on war crimes, which 
clarifies that it need not be shown that the defendant undertook a legal evaluation as to the existence of an armed 
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F. The Gravity Threshold Applicable to the Crime of Aggression Determination 
 
Not every act of aggression will support a prosecution for the crime of aggression. 
Rather, only those acts of aggression that by their ―character, gravity and scale‖ constitute a 
―manifest violation‖ of the Charter when viewed objectively81 can give rise to the crime of 
aggression. The term ―manifest,‖ which was never defined,82 emerged as a compromise term to 
bridge the gap between two camps. The first camp included delegates who wanted no threshold 
at all, on either the theory that every act of aggression should be subject to prosecution
83
 or the 
theory that the Statute already applied only to ―the most serious crimes of international 
concern.‖84 The second camp included delegates who wanted a higher threshold than signified by 
the term ―manifest;‖ that is, they wanted to limit prosecutions to ―flagrant‖ breaches of the 
Charter,
85
 wars of aggression,
86
 ―unlawful‖ uses of force, or acts of aggression geared toward 
occupying or annexing territory.
87
   
The term ―manifest‖ was perennially controversial during the negotiations in light of its 
ambiguity of meaning.  To some, the word referred to the degree of legal clarity or ambiguity 
surrounding the illegality of the act of aggression.  To others, the word denoted some level of 
seriousness in terms of the impugned act‘s scale, consequences or willfulness. These semantic 
debates in turn revealed conflicting goals underlying the threshold element. Although the 
concept of ―borderline‖ case was often employed, there was no consensus on exactly which 
types of situations should not be subject to prosecution. Some states seemed intent on precluding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conflict, its classification as international or non-international, or the status of the victims as protected persons. See 
Elements of Crime, U.N. Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf. 
81
 The Elements of the Crime of Aggressions state: ―The term ‗manifest‘ is an objective qualification.‖ See Annex 
II, Resolution RC/Res.6. 
82
 Article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests one useful definition in connection 
with provisions governing treaty ratifications in violation of domestic law. ―A violation is manifest if it would be 
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith.‖ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980), Art. 46 [hereinafter ―Vienna Convention‖].  
83
 Iran, for one, insisted until the final days of the Kampala Conference that any act of aggression would constitute a 
―manifest violation‖ of the U.N. Charter that should give rise to individual criminal responsibility. 
84
 Rome Statute, supra note ___, art. 1. 
85
 See Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (June 2006—
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1), reprinted in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF 
THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009, 141, 143-44 (Stefan Barriga et al., eds. 
2009) (summarizing debates over the term ―flagrant‖ versus ―manifest.‖).  Early draft texts employed the term 
―flagrant,‖ but this term disappeared in 2007, apparently because it was considered too high a barrier to prosecution. 
See Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (January 2007—ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/1), 
reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 131, 133 (discussing term ―manifest‖). 
86
 See, e.g., Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (June 
20078—ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1), reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 109, 199 (discussing debates over 
including reference to ―war of aggression‖). 
87
 Germany, for example, supported a high threshold for the crime, namely that the act of aggression had ―the object 
or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof by the 
armed forces of the attacking State.‖ See, e.g., Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 
Proposal Submitted by Germany, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13 (July 30, 1999), available at U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/1999/DP.13. 
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the assertion of jurisdiction over minor acts of aggression, such as frontier scuffles
88
 or cross-
border coast guard incursions; others wanted to exclude cases in which there was or would be no 
clear international consensus as to whether the state had committed an unlawful act. Some 
argued that the modifier ―manifest‖ accomplishes neither of these two goals, but rather threatens 
to permit prosecutions of both low-level uses of force and potentially lawful or beneficial casus 
belli, such as bona fide humanitarian interventions; armed responses to terrorist attacks by non-
state actors;
89
 actions in ex post or anticipatory self-defense; assistance to wars of national of 
liberation, peacekeeping or stability missions; actions to enforce no fly zones; actions in defense 
of nationals or to rescue hostages; and exercises of hot pursuit or the abduction of fugitives.
90
 
Supporters of the term argued in turn that the list of acts in Article 8bis(2) would ensure that 
minor incursions across an international border would not be prosecuted as the crime of 
aggression.  
 
G. Defenses to the Crime of Aggression 
 
Delegates did not seriously consider amending the Rome Statute provisions addressed to 
available defenses.
91
 As a result, the crime of aggression is not subject to any special 
justifications or excuses.
92
  In theory, individual defendants can invoke all of the existing 
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 The Libyan-Egyptian War of July 21-24, 1977 provides an example. A group of Libyan civilians protesting 
Egypt‘s impending peace treaty with Israel marched to the Egyptian border.  They were stopped and turned back by 
the Egyptian Army.  Libya responded by firing artillery over the border.  On July 21, it sent a tank battalion over the 
border to conduct a raid against an Egyptian army position in Sallum.  The Egyptians expected the incursion, and a 
much larger force ambushed the Libyans, harrying them back across the border.  The following three days saw 
repeated Egyptian air and commando strikes against targets within Libya. Egypt maintained ground and air 
superiority until an armistice was brokered by Algeria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  
89
 The International Court of Justice has opined that the Charter authorization of self-defense applies only to attacks 
by states. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 ICJ 131, 194 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/131/1671.pdf.   But see Sec. 
Council Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1277(2001) (invoking the right of individual 
or collective self-defence in response to 9/11 attacks in preamble).  
90
 On March 1, 2008, for example, the Colombian military crossed the border into Ecuador and targeted elements of 
the FARC 48th Front, which was suspected of harboring Raúl Reyes, a senior FARC commander. The Colombians 
launched a combined air and ground assault on FARC positions on the Ecuadorian side of the border; when they met 
resistance, the Colombians launched an artillery strike on the encampment, killing some 20 fighters from the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), including Reyes. The regional uproar over the incursion was 
settled at the March 7, 2008, Rio Group meeting in Santo Domingo. See Council on Foreign Relations, FARC, ELN: 
Colombia‟s Left-Wing Guerillas, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 
(August 19, 2009).  
91
 See, e.g., Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (June 
2005—ICC-ASP/4/32), reprinted in BARRIGA, supra note ___, at 167, 173 (compiling discussion as to whether 
Article 33 addressing superior orders should be amended by, or referred to in, the aggression amendments); Stefan 
Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, in BARRIGA, 
supra note ___, at 1, 5 (noting that drafters endeavored to insert the aggression amendments into the ICC Statute as 
smoothly as possible without disturbing the provisions on defenses).   
92
 Some commentators, such as the former Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes David Scheffer, proposed that the 
amendments include special exclusions to the crime of aggression, such as with respect to uses of armed force or 
deployments of armed forces made pursuant Security Council authorization, the ―Uniting for Peace‖ Resolution 
(Res. 377 (1950)), or the inherent right of self-defense acknowledged in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See David 
Scheffer, A Pragmatic Approach to Jurisdictional and Definitional Requirements for the Crime of Aggression in the 
Rome Statute, 41 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT‘L L. 397, 409 (2009).  
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defenses subject to whatever adaptations are necessary set out in the ICC Statute.
93
 According to 
Article 31(1)(c)—the only provision that implicates the aggression determination directly—
neither self-defense nor the defense of others is automatically proven in situations in which the 
defendant is acting on behalf of a state engaged in self-defense.
94
 At trial, the Trial Chamber may 
consider additional defenses pursuant to Article 31(3)
95
 and the applicable Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.
96
  
Although delegates ostensibly adopted these complex provisions by consensus, the above 
analysis reveals the existence of a high degree of disagreement, controversy, and concerted 
silence that belies true agreement among states as to the definition and reach of the crime. It also 
begs the normative question of whether the Rome Statute should include the crime of aggression 
at all. To a certain extent, of course, this question has become a moot one; important and 
influential blocs of states (including the interlocking members of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries, the Union of South American Nations, 
the so-called African Group of States Parties to the ICC, the Arab League, and the European 
Union) invested considerable energy in achieving the adoption of the aggression amendments. 
To varying degrees, these states are committed to seeing this project come to fruition. That said, 
the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until a year after thirty states 
parties have ratified the amendments.
97
 Even then, the ability to prosecute the crime is not 
automatic; the Assembly of States Parties must decide in 2017 whether and how to activate the 
various trigger mechanisms.
98
 At that time, the operationalization of the crime of aggression 
could conceivably be delayed, amended, or even abandoned.  
IV. Is the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Good For Women? 
 
These preliminary observations on the definition of the crime of aggression lead to the 
central question posed by this article: how will the codification and eventual prosecution of the 
crime of aggression in the Rome Statute impact the lives of women? As the analysis that follows 
reveals, many central elements of the final package adopted in Kampala cut two ways. A number 
of considerations commend the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute in 
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 These include the defenses of mental disease or defect, intoxication, self-defense, the defense of others, and duress 
(Article 31(1)); mistake of fact or law (Article 32); and superior orders (Article 33). The defense of property may  be 
raised only with respect to war crimes charges and only when force is employed proportionately to protect essential 
property against an unlawful use of force. Article 31(1)(c), ICC Statute. In particular, Article 31(1)(c) reads: ―in the 
case of war crimes, [the self-defense and the defense of others is available to protect] property which is essential for 
the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, 
against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the 
other person or property protected.‖   
94
 This provision states: ―The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall 
not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph.‖ Id. 
95
 That Article reads: ―At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than 
those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21.‖ 
96
 See Rule 80, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (setting forth procedures for raising a defense under Article 31(3)), 
ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part.II-A) (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-
B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf. 
97
 Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15bis(2) (―The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of 
aggression committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.‖); 
Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15ter(2) (same). 
98
 Id. at Articles 15bis(3) and 15ter(3). 
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theory.  Most of the concerns anticipate how the crime might be invoked and prosecuted in 
practice. Without any firm practice on which to rely, all that remains is speculation, yielding both 
cautious potential and potential cautions. 
 
A. Definitional Limitations and Advantages 
 
Unlike the other core crimes within the ICC Statute, there are no gender-specific charging 
elements in the definition of the crime. An obvious substantive limitation to the aggression 
amendments is the fact that they are confined to acts of aggression committed by states against 
other states, an approach that serves to reinforce the statist orientation of international law.
99
 
There is no notion of a crime of aggression that may be committed by non-state actors, such as 
insurgents or terrorists, or by states against their own citizens.
100
 These blind spots significantly 
discount the diversity of threats to international peace and security in contemporary international 
relations
101
 and guarantee that the prohibition on aggression will apply to only a fraction of the 
armed conflicts endured by women. In this way, the crime of aggression is not coextensive with 
the modern taxonomy of conflict classification under international humanitarian law.
102
 It is only 
when the aggressive acts of non-state actors may be attributed to another state according to 
general principles of state responsibility that the crime of aggression may apply more broadly.
103
 
These principles of attribution may enable aggression charges to be brought in armed conflicts 
that on their surface appear to be internal, but which may in fact sufficiently involve other states 
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 This statist approach is arguably retrograde given the increased application of international law to non-state actors, 
such as terrorist groups, indigenous peoples, multinationals, non-governmental organizations, etc. See CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 159-165 (1989) (discussing deprivations of women‘s 
rights attributed to elements of civil society); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising From 
Conduct Of Non-State Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21 (2005). 
100
 See Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Freedom Fighters” and “Terrorists”: When, if Ever, is Non-State Violence 
Legitimate in International Law?, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373590. 
101
 Mark A. Drumbl, The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression: The Push to Criminalize 
Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT‘L L. 291, 306 (2009). See also Carston 
Stahn, The “End”, the “Beginning of the End” or the “End of the Beginning”? Introducing Debates and Voices on 
the Definition of “Aggression”, 23 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 875, 876-77 (2010) (noting that the ―very concept of 
aggression remains centred on interstate violence‖ and is thus more focused on protecting state interests rather than 
individual rights).   
102
 Not without controversy, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions re-conceptualized wars of national liberation, 
wars against colonial domination, and wars against racist regimes as international armed conflicts under 
international law. Article 1(4), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (June 8, 1977) (applying rules on international armed 
conflicts to ―armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.‖) [hereinafter ―Protocol I‖]. See Judith Gardam, 
A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of Humanitarian Law, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT‘L L. 265, 270 (1988-1989) 
(critiquing the elevation of liberation conflicts to international status and the extension of combatant immunity at the 
expense of protection for civilians).  
103
 See, e.g., Article 8, International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(―the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the State in 
carrying out the conduct.‖).  
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acting through non-state proxies.
104
 Because gender-based violence is often viewed as a 
phenomenon of the private sphere, attributing such crimes to state actors has proved difficult 
over the years. Similar problems of attribution may arise where the acts of non-state actors must 
be attributed to states parties to the ICC for the purpose of an aggression prosecution. If we 
believe prosecutions for the crime of aggression will improve the lives of women—by deterring 
uses of armed force or providing a vector for retribution—the fact that the definition of the crime 
has been drafted to address only a narrow class of armed conflicts will limit its impact 
considerably. 
The leadership element of the crime has both commendable and worrisome aspects. On 
the one hand, the focus of the aggression amendments on leaders, rather than followers, may 
facilitate the prosecution of the architects of aggression. It may be difficult to connect individuals 
sitting at the pinnacle of a chain of command far from the events in question to the commission 
of war crimes or crimes against humanity through principles of derivative or superior liability, 
either because they can hide behind lawful rules of engagement or otherwise evade responsibility 
through raising reasonable doubt about their knowledge of abuses
105
 or ability to exercise 
effective control over subordinates.
106
 That said, the ad hoc tribunals have enjoyed some success 
in prosecuting the caliber of political leaders who might eventually be indicted for the crime of 
aggression: Slobodan Milošević, 107  Momcilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, 108  and Radovan 
Karadžić (before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); Theoneste 
Bagasora and Jean Kambanda (before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Charles 
Taylor (before the Special Court for Sierra Leone); and Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan (before 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia). These leaders, however, hailed from 
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 Because the acts of non-state actors would be attributed to a state as a jurisdictional precondition, the effective 
control test of Nicaragua would likely be applicable rather than the overall control test developed by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Tadić to determine conflict classification. 
Compare Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986, 1986 ICJ Report 1986 14, para. 115 (―For this conduct [by 
the contras] to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that the 
State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations 
were committed.‖) with Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1-A, Judgement, para. 137 (July 15, 1999) (finding 
that the former Yugoslavia exercised sufficient overall control over the Bosnian Serb forces to internationalize the 
conflict and holding that the ―control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the 
context of an armed conflict, the party to the conflict) has a role in organizing, co-ordinating or planning the military 
actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that 
group.‖). 
105
 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT–95–14–A, Judgement, paras. 407-8 (July 29, 2004) (finding accused was not 
aware of abuses perpetrated by subordinates). 
106
 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT–96–21–A, Judgement, paras. 197, 266 (Feb. 20, 2001) (confirming 
effective control standard of subordination in adjudicating the superior responsibility doctrine). 
107
 The ICTY confirmed three omnibus indictments against Milošević concerning the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Kosovo. Milošević died, however, before the close of the defense case, thus robbing the Tribunal and 
victims of a verdict. Nonetheless, the indictment alone set an important precedent as one of the first against a sitting 
head of state.  See ICTY, Case Information Sheet, Slobodan Milošević, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan.pdf.  
108
 The ICTY convicted Biljana Plavšić, former President of the Republika Srpska. The Prosecutor had indicted her 
for genocide, complicity in genocide, and the crimes against humanity of persecution, extermination, killing, 
deportation, and inhumane acts for her role in planning, instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting, and jointly 
executing ethnic cleansing. Plavšić pled guilty to Count 3 of the indictment—persecution. The ICTY sentenced her 
to 11 years‘ imprisonment, though she was granted early release for ―good behavior‖ and ―substantial evidence of 
rehabilitation.‖ Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT–00–39 & 40/1–T, Sentencing Judgement (Feb. 27, 2003).  
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weak, vanquished, obsolete, or pariah regimes. The ICC arrest warrants against President Al-
Bashir of the Sudan provide a first test for whether the ICC will be able to follow suit.
109
 Even 
with ostensible Security Council backing, Al-Bashir remains at large, although he is increasingly 
marginalized internationally if not domestically.
110
 If the likes of Al-Bashir cannot be 
apprehended for the commission of crimes against humanity and genocide against his own 
people, mustering the political will to capture leaders charged with the more controversial crime 
of aggression will be difficult. 
On the other hand, no one has systematically asked women whether they would prefer for 
those who initiate the armed conflicts that unleash other international crimes to be prosecuted if 
it is at the expense of the local warlords whom victims might more directly associate with 
abuses.
111
 While the prosecution of such higher ups for the crime of aggression may bring 
international attention to a region and a conflict, it may also absorb the limited capacity of the 
Court, leaving lower-level offenders to be prosecuted locally, if at all. Where gender-specific 
violence is at issue, women may assign primary responsibility to the direct perpetrators for the 
crimes committed in their communities and against them specifically, rather than the leaders. 
The current tendency of the ICC to focus on militia leaders demonstrates the importance of 
positive complementarity, the promise of which has not yet been fulfilled in the situations 
currently under investigation or indictment by the ICC.
112
 Indeed, the domestic prosecution of 
gender-based violence lags in a number of jurisdictions under consideration by the ICC, so 
leaving such prosecutions to domestic courts may amount to impunity for the individuals whom 
women would most want to see prosecuted. 
 
B. Jurisdictional Hurdles  
 
Assuming the aggression amendments do eventually become operational, it remains to be 
seen whether they will ever be invoked given the complex jurisdictional regime. There are many 
ways in which the architects of war and lesser forms of state violence may be insulated from 
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 See The Prosecutor v.  Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (July 12, 2010). 
110
 Although Al Bashir has travelled to ICC member states, he has had to curtail his international travel and each trip 
generates intense international controversy. See CNN, Kenya, African Union Defend Bashir Visit (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/08/31/kenya.bashir.visit/#fbid=s6-vAC-_af9&wom=false. 
111
 Population-based surveys are inconclusive as to the preferences of affected communities for prosecutions of big 
versus little fish. These diverse attitudes likely reflect the nature of the conflict and the sources of violence. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, ET AL., BUILDING PEACE, SEEKING JUSTICE: A POPULATION–BASED SURVEY ON 
ATTITUDES ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 26 
(August 2010), http://hrc.berkeley.edu/pdfs/BuildingPeace-SeekingJustice-CAR_August2010.pdf (noting that 
approximately a third of respondents in the Central African Republic called for the prosecution of the top political 
leaders). For example, studies in the Democratic Republic of Congo more frequently suggested that militia members 
were a higher prosecutorial priority than political leaders. See HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER ET AL., LIVING WITH FEAR: A 
POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 41, 43 (August 2008), http://hrc.berkeley.edu/pdfs/LivingWithFear-DRC.pdf. In 
Uganda, by contrast, respondents favored prosecution of the leaders of the Lord‘s Resistance Army rather than 
followers, who may have been recruited against their will. HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, NEW POPULATION-BASED DATA 
ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE AND JUSTICE, 6 (2007), http://hrc.berkeley.edu/pdfs/Uganda-survey-research-note.pdf. 
112
 See Focal Points‘ Compilation of Examples of Projects Aimed at Strengthening Domestic Jurisdictions to Deal 
with Rome Statute Crimes, RC/ST/CM/INF.2 (May 30, 2010) (discussing ways to promote positive 
complementarity), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Stocktaking/RC-ST-CM-INF.2-ENG.pdf. 
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prosecution for the crime of aggression. At the procedural level, and as is the case with all the 
crimes within the Court‘s jurisdiction, states parties and the Security Council may decline to 
exercise their authority to refer aggression situations to the Court.
113
 In the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, the Prosecutor may decide not to launch investigations proprio motu 
pursuant to Article 15 or may decline to go forward with referred cases in ―the interests of 
justice‖ per Article 53(1)(c). The Pre-Trial Chamber may not confirm any aggression charges as 
it must pursuant to Article 61. The Security Council may use its Article 16 deferral powers to 
delay cases indefinitely; this virtually ensures that nationals of the Council‘s five permanent 
members, or their close allies, will never come before the Court even if they should be 
implicated in international crimes. The two jurisdictional filters may not render the necessary 
determination that a state committed an act of aggression.  
Beyond these baseline procedural hurdles, however, lie more fundamental limitations to 
the reach of the aggression amendments. In the absence of a Security Council trigger, there are 
gaping holes in the crime‘s jurisdictional regime.  It excludes non-party states altogether,114 and 
it allows states parties to opt out of the aggression provisions.
115
 In this way, the Court‘s 
jurisdictional reach over the crime of aggression is stunted. By way of contrast, the other core 
crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) may be prosecuted so long as either 
the state of nationality of the accused or the territorial state is a party to the Statute.
116
 This 
differential regime stemmed from the fact that delegates viewed the crime of aggression as 
implicating state sovereignty more concretely and acutely than the other atrocity crimes given 
that the crime has at its core the action of a sovereign state,
117
 which under international law 
enjoys certain prerogatives of agency, autonomy, and self-determination.  
 
C. State Consent 
 
The aggression regime is consent-based. The principle of consent, as a manifestation of 
agency, plays a central role in both public international law and feminist theory. In the former, 
state consent has historically provided the basis for the formation and binding nature of 
international norms (as when states voluntarily join treaties, engage in state practice, and 
articulate opinio juris) as well as for the jurisdiction of international institutions.
118
  Indeed, the 
classical theory that international law is solely consent-based
119
 gives rise to one of its most 
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 Any state party as well as the Security Council can trigger a prosecution before the ICC pursuant to Articles 14 
and 13(b), respectively. 
114
 Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15bis(5). 
115
 Resolution RC/Res.6, Article 15bis(4). 
116
 Rome Statute, Article 12(2). 
117
 But see Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State, in GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 185,191-93 (Ige F. Dekker & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2004) (arguing that the three 
original ICC crimes implicate state sovereignty as well). 
118
 According to the Monetary Gold case, an international tribunal is not competent to pronounce upon the rights and 
duties of states absent their consent such that a state cannot be forced to submit to international jurisdiction. Case of 
the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. United States, United Kingdom & France), 1954 I.C.J. 
Rep. 19, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/19/4761.pdf. 
119
 See S.S. Lotus, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927) (―the rules of law binding on states therefore emanate from their 
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law. … 
Restrictions upon the independence of states cannot therefore be presumed.‖).  
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fundamental and enduring criticisms.
120
 Consent is also at the root of the perennial debate 
between positivists and natural law theorists, the latter of whom insist that international law 
contains normative content independent of state consent and that morality is essential to law.
121
 
State consent remains salient within international law notwithstanding the trend toward other 
more institutional or parliamentarian norm-setting processes.
122
 In feminist theory, consent 
functions as an analog to sovereignty in international law as an attribute and entitlement of 
personhood often denied to women.
123
  
Allowing potential aggressor states to choose whether or not to be bound to the penal 
prohibition of aggression warps the privilege of consent, which in many areas of the criminal law 
belongs to the victim if it is relevant at all.
124
 To be sure, the opt-out is theoretically available to 
both potential aggressor and potential victim states. It is clear, however, that the opt-out 
provision is primarily oriented toward potential aggressor states.
125
 Nonetheless, there may be 
valid reasons why aggressed states may not want acts of aggression perpetrated on their 
territories to be the subject of prosecution before the ICC, as when such proceedings might 
exacerbate—rather than defuse—a situation, hamper the ability of warring parties to reach 
political or diplomatic solutions, undermine efforts at reconciliation between embattled societies, 
or risk the revelation of state secrets or sensitive intelligence.
126
  If states parties choose to avail 
themselves of the opt-out, it will insulate particular territories and conflicts from prosecution for 
the crime of aggression. In making the decision to join the aggression amendments or to exercise 
the right to opt out of them, states will not necessarily consult women and other vulnerable 
segments of their populace.  
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 See generally J. Shand Watson, State Consent and Sources of International Obligation, 86 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. 
PROC. 112 (1992) (defending classical theory against its critics). 
121
 See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); 
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
122
 Catherine Brölmann, The Decline of the Subject‟s Individual Consent, presentation in THE CREATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXPLORATION OF NORMATIVE INNOVATION, CONTEXTUAL APPLICATION, AND 
INTERPRETATION IN A TIME OF FLUX (August 6-7, 2010) (noting trends indicating the decline in the role of consent 
in other areas of international law formation).  See also Catherine Brölmann, International Organizations and 
Treaties: Contractual Freedom and Institutional Constraint, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (J. Klabbers, ed., 2010). 
123
 See generally Christina M. Tchen, Comment, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1518 (1983). 
124
 There are certain crimes to which a victim cannot consent, such as murder, although consent at times can give 
rise to mitigation where, for example, the victim engaged in the criminal conduct that resulted in his death. See, e.g., 
State v. Ryan, 534 N.W.2d 766, 784-85 (Neb. 1995) (victim consent mitigator inapplicable where victim—a member 
of a cult group—allegedly initially consented to corporal punishment inflicted by the group leader, but was later 
killed). See also Protocol To Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Annex II, art. 3, Dec. 12, 
2000, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000) (providing that the apparent consent of the victim of trafficking 
is irrelevant where the trafficker threatened or used force, employed forms of coercion, abused his or her power, or 
exploited a position of vulnerability).  See generally Kara Abramson, Note: Beyond Consent, Toward Safeguarding 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, 44 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 473 (2003). 
125
 The opt-out provision reads: ―the Court may … exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, arising from an 
act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept 
such jurisdiction…‖ Article 15bis(4) (emphasis added),  
126
 Once the Court‘s jurisdiction is triggered, it can only be halted by the Security Council (Article 16), the Pre-Trial 
Chamber (by failing, for example, to confirm the charges pursuant to Article 61), or by the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion (pursuant to Article 53 and 61, which set forth when the prosecutor can decline to pursue or withdraw 
charges).  ICC Statute, supra note ___.  
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Of course, it is not inevitable that states parties will act to exit the aggression provisions. 
A genuine faith in the crime, the power of inertia, and contrary pressure from domestic and 
international civil society may make it undesirable or politically difficult for states parties to 
avail themselves of the opt out option set out in the Kampala package.
127
 At the same time, by 
premising the provisions‘ entry into force and jurisdictional reach on exercises of consent, the 
drafters of the aggression regime created opportunities for the exercise or withholding of consent 
to be coerced, which feminist theory has long demonstrated is an inevitable consequence of 
power differentials. Both the ratification process and the opt-out regime threaten a ratification 
―cold war‖ among the Assembly of States Parties as strong states or blocs of states try to coerce 
parties to either join or reject the aggression provisions. Potential victim states—the feminized 
party in any aggression dyad—in particular may find themselves under pressure to opt out of the 
aggression amendments and thus to immunize their territory from aggression charges. 
 The ability of the Security Council to refer situations to the Court under Article 15ter 
without reference to state consent (and to serve as a primary filter for aggression cases brought 
under Article 15bis) will become that much more important, assuming the Assembly of States 
Parties decides to activate this trigger mechanism over the crime.
128
 Ensuring a central role for 
the Council in aggression prosecutions provides an opening for the principles set forth in 
Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, and 1888
129—which recognized that wartime gender-
based and sexual violence against women constitutes a threat to international peace and security 
that may exacerbate conflicts—to contribute a gender perspective to the penal enforcement of the 
prohibition against aggression.
130
 Indeed, the Darfur referral
131
 has already demonstrated the way 
in which Council action can promote accountability for gender-based and sexual violence.
132
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 Very few states parties availed themselves of the war crimes opt out available in Article 124. See Beth Van 
Schaack, Article 124: To Be or Not To Be?, INTLAWGRRLS, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/05/article-124-to-
be-or-not-to-be.html. The Assembly of States Parties decided in Kampala to retain this opt out provision, 
notwithstanding that it has been controversial and little used. See Resolution RC/Res.4 (16 June 2010 13:00), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.4-ENG.pdf. 
128
 There is a risk, however, that the lack of a Security Council filter for the crime of aggression in Council-referred 
situations will chill referrals of other situations. See Article 15ter. The concern is that without a filter control 
mechanism to eliminate aggression charges, the Council may not refer situations when it is concerned that the 
prosecutor may bring improvident aggression charges.  
129
 See supra notes ___. 
130
 But see Dianne Otto, Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law, 10 MELBOURNE J. 
INT‘L L. 11, 19-25 (2009) (exploring some of the feminist critiques of Resolutions 1325 and 1820); Sahla Aroussi, 
Women, Peace & Security: Moving Beyond Feminist Pacifism (2009) 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2009/Aroussi.pdf (arguing that Resolution 1325 institutionalized affirmative yet 
stereotypical views of women and pacifism that may ultimately contribute to women‘s subordination, 
marginalization in decision making, and exclusion from positions of power). 
131
 S.C. Res. 1593 (2005).  
132
 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-
Rahman, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 2007) (finding reasonable 
grounds to believe that the Sudanese Armed forces and the Janjaweed committed, inter alia, rape and outrages upon 
the personal dignity of women and girls), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF;  
The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05 – 01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009) available at  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. 
ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (July 12, 2010) (finding reasonable 
grounds to believe that the defendant is criminally responsible for crimes against humanity and genocide based on 
the fact that government of Sudan forces subjected ―thousands of civilian women … to acts of rape‖), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.   
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Those resolutions may also enable advocates to argue that military interventions in situations 
involving gender-based violence should receive Council approval.  
 
D. The Crime’s Reach: Collateral Damage 
 
These observations about the fundamental responsibility of the architects of aggression 
point to a rationale advanced in support of the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome 
Statute. From the perspective of women, prosecuting the crime of aggression suggests a way that 
much of the harm experienced by women in war can be captured by international criminal law in 
a way it is not currently.
133
 In particular, so-called collateral damage—incidental harm to 
civilians that occurs in the pursuit of a lawful military objective—will become the evidentiary 
foundation for many charges of aggression that might be pursued.  
Adding the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute has filled what many have viewed as 
a lacuna in the pantheon of international crimes.
134
 In the words of the Nuremberg Tribunal in its 
Judgment: ―To initiate a war of aggression … is not only an international crime; it is the supreme 
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the 
accumulated evil of the whole.‖ 135  The theory is that once the peace is breached by the 
commission of an act of aggression or the launching of a war of aggression, conditions exist that 
unleash other forms of violence. Troops are deployed, arms proliferate, detention centers are 
established, human groups are vilified, and brutality becomes normalized.  
At the doctrinal level, war crimes cannot be committed outside of a state of armed 
conflict or occupation, and violence perpetrated by a military force can constitute crimes against 
humanity when the civilian population is attacked on a widespread or systematic basis.
136
 The 
Rwandan tragedy demonstrates that an armed conflict can serve as a pretext for genocide.
137
 A 
state of war thus enables, encourages, and exacerbates multiple forms of violence, including 
gender-based violence. Given the demonstrated causal relationship between acts of aggression 
and other atrocities, a prosecution for the crime of aggression has the potential to empower the 
Court to teller a fuller story of a particular dispute, expose root causes, and assign legal 
responsibility—not just moral opprobrium or diplomatic ire—to those who would unleash 
violence on the globe.
138
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 See Benjamin Ferencz, Can Aggression Be Deterred By Law?, 11 PACE INT‘L L. REV. 341, 342 (1999) (―War is 
the soil from which the worst human rights violations invariably grow.‖); Drumbl, supra note ___ (arguing for a 
more expansive definition of the crime); Linda Jane Springrose, Aggression as a Core Crime in the Rome Statute 
Establishing an International Criminal Court, 1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANS‘L L. J. 151, 163 (1999) (setting 
forth arguments in favor of the inclusion of aggression into the ICC Statute).  
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 See supra note ___. 
135
 Judgment of October 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentence, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL at 498, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT‘L L. 172, 186 
(1947) [hereinafter ―Nuremberg Judgment‖]. 
136
 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT–95–16–T, Judgement (Jan. 14, 2000) (convicting 
defendants of crimes against humanity in connection with the conflict in central Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
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 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR–95–1–T, Judgement, para. 607 (21 May 1999) 
(discussing how the prosecutor‘s allegations showed ―that the armed conflict had been used as pretext to unleash an 
official policy of genocide.‖). 
138
 Neil Boister, The Application of Collective and Comprehensive Criminal Responsibility for Aggression at the 
Tokyo International Military Tribunal: The Measure of the Crime of Aggression?, 8 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUSTICE 425, 425 
(2010) (―‗To judge conventional war crimes while ignoring the fundamental decision to initiate war is like punishing 
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It is clear that the crime of aggression may be the only charge that can be brought in the 
wake of a clean, but unlawful, war or in response to an armed attack by a national armed force 
that does not rise to the level of an armed conflict or target protected persons.
139
 It is often 
assumed that aggressive operations will be more brutal and indiscriminate than other uses of 
force, and this is often borne out in practice. In such conflicts, a comprehensive war crimes 
indictment will go far toward assigning responsibility for the horrors of war. But, even a cleanly 
fought but aggressive war harms civilians, societies, and the international community. Under 
these circumstances, aggression may be the only charge that can be leveled against responsible 
leaders, thus increasing the retributive potential of international criminal law. 
Where the aggression charge is at the forefront of an indictment, the conceptualization of 
the crime will inevitably not be confined to the singular act of crossing an international border 
with guns drawn, but rather will encompass a consideration of a host of consequential harms to 
the victim state and its populace. Thus, an aggression charge can indirectly condemn conduct 
that would otherwise escape penal sanction because it is not a war crime, a crime against 
humanity, or an act of genocide. These consequential harms can include the killing of privileged 
combatants dans le combat, the quintessential act of war; the use of proportionate force against 
lawful targets; and even so-called collateral damage. All such acts may become indirectly 
actionable through an aggression prosecution. Most importantly, the daily harms experienced by 
women in war, whose fate is so often concealed behind the notion of collateral damage, can 
serve as an evidentiary basis for, and gain greater visibility through, the crime of aggression. 
Without such consideration of the concrete consequences or effects of an act of aggression, the 
Court would be unable to evaluate the gravity threshold, and the crime of aggression would be 
reduced to a mere abstraction.  
The potential of the codification and prosecution of the crime of aggression to condemn 
the consequences of war was recognized during the post-World War II era, when the Allies first 
prosecuted crimes against the peace, although this theory of expansive responsibility never 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a petty thief while letting a murderer escape.‘‖) (quoting Yasuaki Ōnuma, Beyond Victor‟s Justice, XI JAPAN ECHO 
63, 68 (1984)).  
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 The March 26, 2010, torpedo attack on the South Korean Warship ―Cheonan‖ provides a useful example. Eye 
witness accounts, an examination of the damage to the vessel, an analysis of seabed evidence, and the recovered 
torpedo all led a joint military/civilian international investigation to conclude that the ship was sunk by a North 
Korean torpedo.  There was no ―other plausible explanation.‖ Nick Loader, Investigation concludes North Korean 
missile sunk the Cheonan killing 46, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT (May 21, 2010), available at 
http://us.asiancorrespondent.com/video/investigation-concludes-north-korea.htm. The attack thus appears to be a 
classic case of bilateral aggression, with a clear victim state and a clear aggressor state without all of the messiness 
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incidents and incursions, shots over the proverbial bow, etc. without a clear ―prime mover‖ contemplated by Article 
2 of Resolution 3314 (―The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima 
facie evidence of an act of aggression … ―). The victims of the Cheonan attack were 46 crew members, all male, and 
no civilians were injured.  Assuming the attack exceeds the necessary threshold with respect to ―character, gravity, 
and scale‖ in Article 8bis(1), which it may not on its own unless the long history of tensions between the two nations 
are taken into account, aggression would be the only chargeable crime. See Democracy Now!, Historian Bruce 
Cumings: US Stance on Korea Ignores Tensions Rooted in 65-Year-Old Conflict; North Korea Sinking Could Be 
Response to November „09 South Korea Attack (May 27, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/5/27/nk 
(quoting historian‘s comment that the attack was part of a ―continuing war that has never ended‖). The attack could 
not be charged as a war crime (for lack of an armed conflict or victim with protected person status) or crime against 
humanity (for lack of an attack against a civilian population). Given that men predominate in national forces, 
prosecutions for such acts of aggression are not likely to involve significant numbers of women victims. See supra 
note ___.  
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received the full blessing of either international tribunal.
140
  Lawyers within the U.S. delegation 
developed the legal position that those who initiated unlawful wars of aggression were therefore 
responsible for all the wrongs that then ensued.
141
 This argument found particular expression in 
the Tokyo proceedings before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), in 
which the defendants were charged in one set of counts with murder and mayhem in addition to 
crimes against the peace.
142
 A number of these counts focused on conventional war crimes, such 
as the killing of prisoners of war and the literal and figurative rape of Nanking. Counts thirty-
seven through forty-three, however, focused on the killing of members of the armed forces 
during Japan‘s aggressive actions. For example, Count thirty-eight of the indictment charged a 
number of defendants with participation in a common plan or conspiracy the object of which was 
to ―kill and murder … both members of the armed forces … and civilians.‖143 Count thirty-nine 
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 See United States v. Altstötter et al. (―The Justice Trial‖), UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, VI LAW 
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opening statement, the British Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, reasoned that: ―The killing of combatants in war is 
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is nothing to justify the killing, and these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber 
band.‖ Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Revoking An Aggressor‟s License To Kill Military Forces Serving The United 
Nations: Making Deterrence Personal, 22 MD. J. INT‘L L. & TRADE 1, 1 (1998). But see Hersch Lauterpacht, The 
Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT‘L L. 206, 217 n.4 (surmising that Shawcross was 
―referring not to the responsibility of the individual members of the armed forces of the aggressor but only to the 
liability of those guilty of planning and instigating the war.‖). 
142
 See International Military Tribunal for the Far East Indictment, Annex 6 to Judgment, available at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-A6.html. Count 37 read:  
 
The following Counts charge the crimes of murder, and conspiracy to murder, being acts for 
which it is charged that the persons named and each of them are individually responsible, being at 
the same time Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, 
contrary to all the paragraphs of Article 5 of the said Charter, to International Law, and to the 
domestic laws of all the countries where committed, including Japan, or to one or more of them. 
 
Id. See also Boister, supra note ___ at 439.  
143
 The Count charged the defendants with endeavoring to: 
 
unlawfully to kill and murder the persons described below, by initiating unlawful hostilities 
against the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Thailand, and 
unlawfully ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of Japan to attack the territory, ships 
and airplanes of the said nations or some of them at times when Japan would be at peace with the 
said nations. The persons intended to be killed and murdered were all such persons, both members 
of the armed forces of the said nations and civilians, as might happen to be in the places at the 
times of such attacks. The said hostilities and attacks were unlawful … and the accused and the 
said armed forces of Japan could not therefore, acquire the rights of lawful belligerents. 
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similarly charged the attack on Pearl Harbor, at a time when Japan and the United States were at 
peace, and the deaths of members of the naval and military forces of the United States. In 
support of these charges, it was argued that the Japanese defendants could be charged with 
murder simpliciter in connection with all civilian and combatant deaths in the Pacific theater, 
even if they would otherwise have been lawful killings under the jus in bello. The theory was 
that the illegality of the war rendered Japanese defendants unprivileged combatants and thus 
vitiated any defense of combatant immunity.
144
 For their part, the defendants argued that 
―killings in the course of belligerent operations except in so far as they constituted violations of 
the rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents of war and are not 
murder.‖145  
Notwithstanding that the case was teed up to challenge the conceptual divide between the 
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, the Tokyo Tribunal ultimately dismissed those counts 
addressed to a conspiracy to commit any crimes other than crimes against the peace
146
 and 
addressed the harms alleged in the murder counts in connection with the omnibus crimes against 
the peace counts.
147
 The Tribunal seemed to recognize that the theory of comprehensive liability 
suggested by the murder counts would swallow all the other particulars of the indictment
148
 when 
it held: ―In all cases the killing is alleged as arising from the unlawful waging of war. … If … 
the war, in any particular sense, is held to have been unlawful, then this involves unlawful 
killings not only upon the dates and at the places stated in these counts [of murder] but at all 
places in the theatre of war and at all times throughout the period of the war.‖149  
The Allies‘ attempt to hold Japanese defendants liable for all the harm caused by their 
aggressive war reflects the enduring intuitive appeal of the proposition that an otherwise lawful 
act of war, such as a proportionate attack on a military objective, committed within the context of 
an unlawful war is itself ipso facto unlawful even if no identifiable war crime has been 
committed. This proposition is, while appealing, doctrinally flawed. The long-standing 
distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello  reflects the understanding that an 
unlawful war can be fought lawfully and a just war can be fought unlawfully. Thus, 
considerations of the right to use force are detached from considerations of how force is used or 
its consequences,
150
  and ―once the primary rules prohibiting the use of force (i.e., the ius ad 
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 Bush, supra note ___, at 2403, citing Letter of 19 Dec. 1944 by U.S. War Department lawyer William C. Chanler 
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charge of murder.‘‖). Indeed, charging straight murder would have avoided the ex post facto problems posed by 
charging crimes against the peace. Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 
397, 455-56 (1945-1946).  
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 Judgment, 101 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL 48,436a (R. John Pritchard, ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
―IMFTE Judgment‖].  
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 Id. at 48,450. 
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 ―No good purpose is to be served … in dealing with these parts of the offenses by way of counts for murder when 
the whole offence of waging those wars unlawfully is put in issue upon the counts charging the waging of such 
wars.‖ Id. at 48,452-48,453.   
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 That the consequences of war are not taken into effect in determining its lawfulness gives rise to a perennial 
feminist critique of the law of war. See Dianne Otto, Integrating Questions of Gender into Discussions of the “Use 
of Force” in the International Curriculum, 6 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 219, 221-2 (1995). 
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bellum) have been violated, the subsidiary rules of ius in bello must apply.‖151 This acoustic 
separation is pragmatic as well as philosophical: the goal is to ensure compliance with 
humanitarian law regardless of which party is responsible for breaching international peace in 
the first place.
152
 Pursuant to the parity or symmetry thesis of international humanitarian law 
(IHL), the many protective principles of the jus in bello apply equally to all sides of a conflict, 
without reference to reciprocity and regardless of whether the jus ad bellum has been violated.
153
  
The severability and independence of the two sets of doctrines also reflects states‘ contractual 
obligations; once the Geneva Conventions achieved universal ratification, all states of the world 
became equally bound by the core jus in bello prohibitions contained in those treaties, which 
apply regardless of the origins or causes of the conflict.
154
  
 
E. International Humanitarian Law Repercussions 
 
Adding the crime of aggression to the jurisdiction of the ICC and enabling the 
prosecution of the deployment of armed force for unlawful ends has the potential to create 
bridges across the conceptual divide between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The apparent 
untraversability of these bodies of law exists for a reason, however. As such, their linkage may 
create negative consequences vis-à-vis the efficacy of some of the core protective doctrines of 
humanitarian law that apply to all combatants, regardless of which side started the conflict in the 
first place. Now that the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello will intersect in the ICC, labeling one 
side to a conflict ―the aggressor‖ and the other side ―the aggressed‖ may undermine support for 
IHL on both sides, weakening a source of protection in international law for women and other 
vulnerable groups. The predicate aggression determination may also lead to differential liability 
for other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC among combatants affiliated with the 
aggressor and aggressed states.  
Enabling the prosecution of the crime of aggression may undermine support for the jus in 
bello among belligerents representing the putative aggressor state. Governmental support at the 
highest level—where rules of engagement are drafted, targets indentified, and military strategy 
developed—is crucial to ensure compliance with humanitarian law more broadly. If leaders and 
policy-makers are susceptible to the threat of an aggression prosecution, an institutional 
commitment to adhere to humanitarian law may flag and weaken incentives to ensure that acts of 
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war are implemented in accordance with humanitarian law. Potential defendants may 
legitimately fear that there will be a thumb on the scale against them in any war crimes 
prosecution when the conflict itself has been declared aggressive and their state determined to be 
the aggressor.
155
 Indeed, at the most radical of levels, does the principle of military necessity—
which requires that armed attacks be designed and implemented to defeat the opponent 
militarily—have any meaning in the context of an unjust war? 156  Unless judges rigorously 
cordon off the aggression and war crimes analyses,
157
 the proportionality analysis and other 
applications of IHL may differ among combatants depending on which side of the conflict they 
represent.
158
 This may create perceptions of bias and unfairness among accused individuals from 
different sides to a conflict.  
Paradoxically, the threat of prosecution for the crime of aggression may weaken the 
enforcement of humanitarian law by those deemed to be the aggressed party as well.  
Combatants hailing from the aggressed state may feel a lesser incentive to adhere to these rules, 
because they have been deemed to be engaged in a just war.
159
 Prosecutors, judges and other 
observers for that matter may be more forgiving of breaches in such conflicts and cut combatants 
some slack—consciously or unconsciously.160 In the context of criminal proceedings, this bias 
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L. J. 639, 860 (2004)). 
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 Sassòli, supra note ___, at 257. 
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 Id. at 247.  
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may have an impact on the charges that are brought, the convictions that are handed down, and 
the sentences that are imposed.
161
   
This potentiality arose in the Sierra Leonean context in the case against the surviving 
leaders of the Civilian Defense Forces, pro-government militia that formed to assist the 
government in resisting the Revolutionary United Front/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
rebel juntas and restoring the democratically-elected government.
162
 In a case involving charges 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber rejected the defendants‘ defense 
of necessity,
163
 but determined that the fact that the defendants were fighting for a just cause was 
a mitigating factor at sentencing.
164
 In fact, one judge would have acquitted the defendants 
altogether.
165
 Over a dissent,
166
 the Appeals Chamber reversed, ruling that allowing 
consideration into the political motives behind the defendants‘ participation in the conflict would 
provide ―implicit legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally violates the law—the precise conduct 
this Special Court was established to punish.‖167 The sentences were increased to 15 and 20 
years.
168
  
Adherence to IHL may also deteriorate when individuals lower down the chain of 
command are subject to prosecution for the crime of aggression. There may be no threat of 
prosecution for aggression before the ICC for those below the highest ranks, since the crime of 
aggression is framed as a leadership crime.
169
 If, however, states parties incorporate the crime of 
aggression into their domestic penal codes,
170
 as they have often done with respect to the other 
                                                          
161
 The failure of the ICTR to indict members of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front may reflect this bias. Indeed, 
Prof. Ruth Wedgwood has argued that the ICTY‘s one-sided prosecutions, traceable in part to political pressure 
from Rwanda‘s allies, has contributed to the establishment of a repressive government. See Ruth Wedgwood, Paul 
Kagame and Rwanda‟s Faux Democracy, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 5, 2010) (arguing that the ―West‘s failure to 
address Tutsi violations of the laws of war has allowed [Rwandan President] Kagame to conclude, justifiable, that he 
can do nearly anything with impunity.‖).  
162
 See Danny Hoffman, The Meaning of a Militia: Understanding the Civil forces of Sierra Leone, 106 AFRICAN 
AFFAIRS 636 (Dec. 8, 2010).  
163
 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu 
Kondewa, para. 74 (Oct. 9, 2007). 
164
 Id. at paras. 79-91. The Special Court imposed a sentence of six and eight years of imprisonment compared to 
sentences of 45 and 50 years meted out to rebel defendants. 
165
 Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Separate Concurring and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. 
Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute, para. 90 (Aug. 2, 2007), 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/SCSL/The%20CDF%20Judgment_3_2-8-2007.pdf (―[T]here can be little 
doubt that in the context of the intensely conflictual situation prevailing at the material time in Sierra Leone 
dominated by bitter chaos, fear, alarm and despondency, fighting for the restoration of democracy and constitutional 
legitimacy could be rightly perceived as an act of both patriotism and altruism, overwhelmingly compelling 
disobedience to a supranational regime of proscriptive norms.‖). See also id. at paras. 68-92 (arguing that defendants 
are entitled to the defense of necessity). 
166
 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-01-14-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion of 
Honourable Justice George Gebaga King, paras. 26-31 (May 28, 2008). 
167
 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-01-14-A, Judgment, paras. 530-34 (May 28, 
2008).   
168
 Id. at para. 565. 
169
 See text accompanying note ___. 
170
 Very few states at present have a crime of aggression in their penal codes. A few provisions exist in the codes of 
Central Asia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere; most predate the ICC. To the extent that they include a definition at all, 
these code provisions are loosely based on the WWII definitions and penalize only a ―war of aggression,‖ or are 
predicated on violations of international treaties.  See Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Evaluating Domestic Legislation on 
the Customary Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute‟s Complementarity Regime, in THE EMERGING 
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ICC crimes,
171
 national legislators may reformulate the definition of the crime to reach lower-
level perpetrators, such as officers with operational or tactical command,
172
 as opposed to those 
with strategic command, or even foot soldiers. The rationale for prosecuting leaders for initiating 
an act of aggression is not always easily contained to the highest leadership circle.
173
 At a 
minimum, if taken to its natural conclusion, and in keeping with the maxim ex injuria jus non 
oritur (―a right cannot arise from a wrong‖), all officers and foot soldiers down the chain of 
command could be stripped of the defense of combatant immunity
174
 for participating in an act 
of aggression absent some theory that the rank and file were acting under duress or were non-
culpable innocent agents entitled to assume they were fighting a lawful war.
175
  Without the 
promise of combatant immunity, combatants may lose tangible incentives to adhere to the jus in 
bello,
176
 although may still comply for deontological reasons. IHL, perhaps more than any other 
body of law, is based on carefully balanced privileges and responsibilities; remove a privilege 
and the commitment to respect the corresponding prohibitions wanes.
177
 
It remains to be seen whether states incorporate the crime of aggression into their penal 
codes. The aggression amendments do not oblige states parties to do so. The final text contains 
several important interpretive ―understandings‖ addressed to the customary international law 
status of the definition of aggression adopted
178
 and denying any right or obligation on the part of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 725 (Carston Stahn & Göran Sluiter, eds., 2009) (compiling 
domestic statutes on aggression). 
171
 States are not strictly obliged to harmonize their domestic codes with the Rome Statute or to enable the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction over ICC crimes. The only mandatory language in the Statute obliging states parties to enact 
domestic legislation concerns state cooperation (Part 9) and the obligation to assert jurisdiction over offenses against 
the administration of justice (Article 70(4)).  There is preambular language recalling pre-existing obligations for all 
states (not just states parties) to prosecute international crimes. In practice, however, many states parties have 
amended their domestic law to mirror the ICC Statute in order to enjoy the privilege of complementarity. See 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Implementation of the Rome Statute, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (compiling statutes). 
172
 Campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic objectives in theaters or operational areas are planned at the 
operational level of war. Battles and engagements are planned and executed at the tactical level of war. The crime of 
aggression, as it has been formulated within the ICC amendments, is prosecutable at the strategic level of war—that 
echelon in which a nation‘s leadership deploys military resources to achieve strategic security objectives. See DEPT. 
OF DEFENSE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/. 
173
 See generally David Rodin, Two Emerging Issues of the Jus Post Bellum: War Termination and the Liability of 
Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, in C. Stahn & J.K. Kleffner (eds): JUS POST-BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF 
TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE 53, 61 (2008) (arguing that there are strong reasons to extend aggression 
liability to ordinary line soldiers). 
174
 See Sharp, supra note ___ (arguing that the criminality of aggression should be extended beyond the senior 
leadership of a state to encompass all of those persons who kill in furtherance of an illegal use of force).  
175
 Boister, supra note ___, at 443.  
176
 François Bugnion, Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT‘L REV. RED 
CROSS 523, 541 (2002) (―It is a delusion to expect a soldier to respect the laws and customs of war if he himself is 
declared an outlaw by the mere fact of belonging to a State designated an aggressor. No amount of legal argument 
will persuade a combatant to respect the rules when he himself has been deprived of their protection.‖). 
177
 Lauterpacht, supra note ___, at 211-213 (considering this bald tradeoff a feature of the ―defective‖ nature of 
international law).  
178
 The customary law status of the crime of aggression was central to the British House of Lords case of R. v. Jones, 
[2006] UKHL 16, one of the few domestic cases to consider the crime of aggression. The issue arose in Jones as a 
defense to charges of aggravated trespass and criminal damage when the defendants attempted to disrupt activities at 
British military bases to impede British involvement in the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).  The defendants argued 
that they were entitled to use reasonable force to prevent the commission of a crime (viz., the crime of aggression). 
The House of Lords determined that although the crime of aggression existed under customary international law, no 
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states parties to incorporate the definition of aggression into their penal codes.
179
 These 
understandings may be instrumental in discouraging states from internalizing the crime of 
aggression, drafting their own idiosyncratic definitions of the crime, or subjecting the crime to 
expansive bases of jurisdiction, such as universal jurisdiction.
180
  
 
F. The Two Sides of Deterrence  
 
As is the goal of any penal prohibition, advocates for the crime of aggression hope that in 
addition to dispensing retribution for past acts of violence, the existence of the crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute will contribute to the deterrence of future acts of aggression. The 
theory is that the threat of prosecution and the assignment of individual criminal responsibility 
will raise the cost of resorting to armed force in international relations, in a way that recourse 
only to principles of state responsibility for breaches of the U.N. Charter‘s prohibition on the use 
of force arguably has not. Needless to say, it would be a singular achievement if the crime of 
aggression were able to reduce the incidence of conflict in the world and to make real the ―right 
to peace‖ for which so many women (and men) yearn.181 And yet, the counter-fear exists that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
such crime existed in British law so the defense was unavailable. See Beth Van Schaack, Adjudicating Aggression in 
Domestic Courts, INTLAWGRRLS, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/04/adjudicating-aggression-in-
domestic.html. 
179
 These Understandings read:  
 
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of the act of aggression and the 
crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments shall, in 
accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any 
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute. 
 
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation 
to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State. 
 
The United States in particular advocated for these provisions to emphasize that the amendments would be adopted 
solely for the purpose of prosecutions under the Rome Statute and that there is a divergence of views among states 
as to whether the definitions of ―crime of aggression‖ in Article 8-bis(1) and ―act of aggression‖ in Article 8-bis(2) 
reflect statements of customary international law. The ultimate goal was to undermine any tendency to refer to these 
definitions as evidence of the progressive development of customary international law and to signal that states are 
not obliged to incorporate the crime of aggression into their domestic codes, or launch domestic prosecutions for the 
crime, upon ratification or acceptance of the aggression amendments. The concern was that such prosecutions would 
wreak havoc on the international scene were states to incorporate the definition of aggression in their domestic penal 
codes and then indict world leaders in municipal courts, especially if based on expansive principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. See Beth Van Schaack, Understanding Aggression, INTLAWGRRLS, 
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search?q=understanding+aggression.  
180
 The Princeton Principles list crimes against the peace as among the international crimes subject to universal 
jurisdiction. Article 2, Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 29 (2001), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html. The commentary indicates that the issue was discussed at 
length and that while many argued that the crime ―constitutes the most serious international crime, others 
contend[ed] that defining the crime of ‗aggression‘ is in practice extremely difficult and divisive. In the end, ‗crimes 
against the peace‘ were included, despite some disagreement, in part in order to recall the wording of Article 6(a) of 
the Nuremberg Charter.‖ Id. at 47. 
181
 See G.A. Res. 33/73, Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace (Dec. 15, 1978); Philip Alston, 
Peace as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 198 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. 
Weston, eds., 1980). 
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codification of the crime of aggression, given that the text is broadly and ambiguously worded, 
will over-deter some uses of force that may be beneficial to civilians and women in particular, 
such as humanitarian interventions.  
Though we are almost twenty years into the renaissance of the field, the deterrent effect 
of international criminal law remains speculative.
182
 Although they will undoubtedly be high-
profile, aggression cases may prove to be too episodic to exert a general deterrent effect in the 
classical sense in which world leaders weigh the costs of injury against the perceived benefit of 
the prohibited activities.
183
 Assuming the most robust enforcement, international criminal law 
involves extreme conduct that is perhaps less susceptible to formal processes of deterrence. Even 
the crime‘s most avid supporters likely do not anticipate that the crime will bring about a Kantian 
perpetual peace.
184
 Yet, the threat of suit for the crime of aggression will undoubtedly register 
some impact, especially on political leaders, who are concerned about preserving their political 
viability domestically and abroad and are more likely to calculate the costs and benefits of a 
particular course of action.
185
 The reverberations generated by a single indictment against a 
world leader for aggression may be enough to compel other governmental officials to think twice 
before resorting to force. In the long run, the hope is that political elites will eventually 
internalize more robust inhibitions against resorting to the use of force in their international 
relations.
186
  
The deterrent potential of the crime of aggression gives rise to a counter-fear that the new 
provisions will over-deter and, in effect, chill lawful, beneficial, or otherwise legitimate uses of 
force,
187
 such as: multilateral, regional,
188
 or unilateral peacekeeping missions and humanitarian 
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 See generally David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM 
INT‘L L. J. 473 (1999) (questioning the deterrent effect of international criminal law); Amann, Group Mentality, 
supra note ___, at 115-117 (questioning goal of deterrence in international criminal law). Indeed, it remains 
speculative in domestic penal law as well.  
183
 See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 960-1 (1966) 
(noting difficulty of proving deterrence empirically).   
184
 Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (1795), in THE MORALITY OF WAR: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 
READINGS 110 (Larry May et al., eds. 2006). 
185
 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 7, 11 (2001) (―Where leaders engage in some form of rational cost-benefit calculation, the threat of 
punishment can increase the costs of a policy that is criminal under international law. Leaders may be desperate, 
erratic, or even psychotic, but incitement to ethnic violence is usually aimed at the acquisition and sustained exercise 
of power.‖). 
186
 See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (discussing processes of acculturation, persuasion, and coercion at work in the 
international legal system). 
187
 Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of „Humanitarian Intervention,‘ 93 AM. J. INT‘L L. 824, (1999) (arguing that 
the Kosovo intervention was legitimate). 
188
 In 1990, then-President Samuel Doe asked Nigeria for assistance in repelling Charles Taylor in the First Liberian 
Civil War. Nigeria, in turn, brought in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which 
deployed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Well after the fact, the 
U.N. Security Council approved the intervention via Chapter VII. See S.C. Res. 788 (Nov. 19, 1992) (welcoming 
ECOMOG involvement in Liberia). It is thus unclear if ECOMOG was operating in Liberia with the full consent of 
President Doe; it was certainly not acting with U.N. endorsement from 1990 until the passage of Resolution 788. In 
any case, ECOWAS members could not have counted on receiving retroactive blessing from the Council at the time 
they felt compelled to act. See generally Christopher Tuck, Every Car or Moving Object Gone” ECOMOG 
Intervention in Liberia, 4 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, available at http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm. The primary 
focus of international criticism of the intervention concerned misconduct by ECOMOG troops. Id. See generally, 
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interventions;
189
 rescue operations;
190
 or even military responses to acts of terrorism that might 
incapacitate terrorist organizations and prevent future attacks.
191
 The potential for over-
deterrence stems from the fact that amendments to the Rome Statute do not include any express 
exceptions for such uses of force. Although supporters of this definition tout its Resolution 3314 
pedigree, the amendments to the Statute depart from that instrument in subtle yet significant 
ways. Most importantly, Resolution 3314—and the U.N. Charter for that matter192—envision a 
continuum of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the level of aggression. Indeed, 
the Resolution‘s preamble states that ―aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force.‖193 Article 8bis standing alone, by contrast, envisions that every violation of 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as well as violations of a state‘s sovereignty, a concept left 
undefined, constitute acts of aggression that may give rise to prosecution for the crime of 
aggression. Uncertainties surrounding the definition of the crime, coupled with the checkerboard 
jurisdictional regime and the concomitant unequal threat of prosecution among states, will no 
doubt impede coalition-building, adherence to military alliances, and other multilateral responses 
to global threats. States that have joined the aggression amendments may have different tolerance 
levels for the degree of uncertainty inherent to the reach of the aggression amendments. This 
difficulty in mobilizing joint action may paradoxically lead to more unilateral actions by states 
not subject to the moderating effects of joint action.  
 
1. Chilling Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Whereas the concept of self-defense is well established under international law, the right 
to use force in defense of others is less so.  Advocates of an emerging, or surviving, norm in 
favor of humanitarian intervention raise a host of inter-related arguments. One textual argument 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAGING WAR TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(June 1993), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/#2.  
189
 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereign (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect 69 
(International Development Research Centre 2001)(―the responsibility to protect its people from killing and other 
grave harm was the most basic and fundamental of all the responsibilities that sovereignty imposes—and if a state 
cannot or will not protect its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for human protection purposes, 
including ultimately military intervention, by others in the international community may be warranted in extreme 
cases.‖); 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. A/RES/60/1, para. 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) 
(―Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means.‖); S.C. Res. 1674, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (―[The 
Security Council] reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.‖). But see Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, Transmittal Letter 
from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, challenges and Change, para. 203, addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004) (envisioning the responsibility to protect doctrine as limited to action 
by the Security Council).  
190
 See, e.g., Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages 
at the Entebbe Airport, 15 I.L.M. 1224 (1976). 
191
 Keith A Petty, Criminalizing Force: Resolving the Threshold Question for the Crime of Aggression, 33 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 105 (2009) (considering the legality of responding to terrorist attacks with armed force under the 
prohibition of aggression) [hereinafter, Petty, Criminalizing Force].  
192
 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter envisions three prohibited uses of force: ―threat[s] to the peace, breach[es] of the 
peace, or act[s] of aggression.‖  
193
 Resolution 3314, supra note ___.  
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attempts to carve out an implicit exception for humanitarian intervention from the language of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter by noting that states engaging in humanitarian interventions do not 
seek territorial aggrandizement or to undermine the target state‘s political independence—the 
sovereign values protected by the Charter.
194
  Advocates also raise moral arguments drawing on 
historical just war and natural law theory
195
 and argue that the post-WWII period ushered in a 
new normative conception of sovereignty by which adherence to human rights values is now 
constitutive of statehood,
196
 and a state that fails to respect these rights forfeits the right to enjoy 
non-intervention.
197
 By this view, sovereign prerogatives of non-intervention and monopolistic 
territorial power are contingent upon states manifesting respect for human rights. Advocates also 
point to state practice (such as the 1999 Kosovo intervention) and opinio juris (such as the 
Responsibility to Protect initiative
198
 and the African Union Charter
199
) to support an emerging 
customary international law norm in favor of interventions on purely humanitarian grounds when 
grave violations are at issue and other efforts (diplomacy, sanctions, etc.) have failed.  
Nonetheless, the legality and desirability of humanitarian intervention remains contested, 
and the aggression amendments have done little to clarify the law in this area. Indeed, even the 
Kosovo intervention of 1999 (Operation ―Allied Force‖)—arguably the best example of a bona 
fide, i.e. non-pretextual, humanitarian intervention—would at first glance meet all the elements 
of the crime of aggression as they have been defined in Article 8bis.
200
  Specifically, the 
intervention was an air war consisting of an attack or bombardment by the armed forces of a 
State against the territory of another State.
201
 Although NATO possessed no territorial ambitions, 
the intervention did violate the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and, arguably, sought to 
undermine the political independence of the state (if not ultimately effectuate regime change).  
Most, although not all, scholars concede that the intervention was illegal under the Charter 
framework.  Many, however, concluded that it was nonetheless legitimate and justifiable under 
the circumstances,
202
 as evidenced by the fact that it generated little in the way of overt censure 
                                                          
194
 Article 2(4) states: ―All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.‖ 
195
 See generally THE MORALITY OF WAR: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS (Larry May et al., eds. 2006) 
(compiling excerpts from just war theorists throughout history).  
196
 See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty And Human Rights In Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT‘L. 
L. 866 (1990). 
197
 FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 16 (2005).  
198
 See supra note ___. 
199
 In particular, Article 4 on foundational Principles states that:  
 
The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: … (h) the right of the Union 
to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.  
 
2000 African Union Charter, http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Constitutive_Act.htm#Article4. The full 
impact of this provision on the legality of humanitarian intervention is unclear given that this text appears alongside 
an articulation of the principles of sovereign equality of nations, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the prohibition 
of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union, and non-interference. 
200
 See Sean Murphy, Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT‘L L. 341 (2009).  
201
 See Article 8bis(2), Resolution RC/Res.6. 
202
 See INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO: THE KOSOVO REPORT, available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm (―The Commission concludes that the NATO 
military intervention was illegal, but legitimate.‖). 
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from other members of the international community.
203
 At the same time, for that matter, the 
intervention did not receive uniform praise.  Many post-colonial states remain understandably 
wary of endorsing a broad right of humanitarian intervention. The intervention was a ―manifest‖ 
violation of the Charter if measured by scale and consequences insofar as it wrecked 
considerable damage on Yugoslavia; however, it was not necessarily an errant or flagrant 
violation given lingering debates over its legality, morality, and wisdom.
204
 
Delegates drafting the definition of aggression were not unaware of the potential conflict 
between the contested doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the crime of aggression. Indeed, 
the Kosovo intervention occurred just as the Preparatory Commission was starting its work on 
issues left unfinished at the 1998 Rome Conference. Up until the discussions in Kampala, 
delegates largely preferred to adopt a concerted silence on this point, so as to not jeopardize their 
forward progress in defining aggression by getting bogged down in already intractable debates 
over the legality or propriety of humanitarian intervention.  
Nonetheless, in Kampala, the United States addressed the issue head on in connection 
with its objections to the definition of the crime of aggression contained in Article 8bis.  In prior 
diplomatic meetings and again in Kampala, the United States made overtures to reconsider the 
definition of aggression, but achieved little traction.
205
 Delegates were simply too invested in the 
definition and its provenance to reopen the debate at such a late date. In the United States‘  
second formal intervention in Kampala, Harold Hongju Koh, the Department of State Legal 
Advisor, stated the United States‘ view that the definition itself was ―flawed,‖ and that the 
apparent consensus on the definition of the crime might actually mask significant disagreements 
over what types of conduct would constitute the crime of aggression.
206
 At the same time, the 
United States acknowledged that it might be possible to address these concerns without revisiting 
the definition itself.
207
 The United States thus focused on having key text inserted into the 
amendment package at Annex III, which was slated to contain a number of other interpretive 
                                                          
203
 Compare Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions Under International 
Law, 7 INT‘L LEGAL THEORY 1 (2001) (arguing that such interventions are a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter 
absent Security Council authorization) with Amy Eckert, The Non-Intervention Principle and International 
Humanitarian Interventions, 7 INT‘L LEGAL THEORY 27 (2001) (arguing that they are lawful so long as they are 
sufficiently justified).  This non-rejoinder may also be explained, of course, by disparities of power and a wariness 
to criticize NATO.  
204
 See Petty, Criminalizing Force, supra note ___, at 119-130 (arguing that the law regarding humanitarian 
intervention is too uncertain to satisfy the ―manifest‖ threshold requirement).  
205
 The United States was put in a difficult position to challenge the definition of the crime. Under the administration 
of President George W. Bush, the United States did not participate in any of the sessions of the Working Group of 
the Crime of Aggression, even though it was entitled to. Once President Barack Obama took office, it took some 
time to reformulate the U.S. policy toward the Court, and so the United States missed the Seventh Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties held in January 2009. The U.S. finally began participating in subsequent sessions, but by 
then, the definition enjoyed significant momentum and delegates were loath to allow a latecomer—and a non-state 
party at that—to reopen the negotiations. 
206
 Harold H. Koh Intervention, June 4, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/142665.htm  
(―Although we respect the considerable effort that has gone into the Princeton Process [the intersessional aggression 
negotiations], we believe that without agreed-upon understandings, the current draft definition remains flawed. We 
are concerned that the apparent consensus on the wording of Article 8bis masks sharp disagreement on particular 
points regarding the meaning of that language that must be addressed before the amendments on the crime of 
aggression can enter into force.‖).  
207
  Id. (noting that the proposals ―introduce the idea of addressing concerns through understandings or other 
documents, without the need for disturbing the language of Article 8bis itself.‖). 
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―understandings.‖208 The United States‘ proposed its understandings for a number of purposes: to 
reshape the definition and its future interpretation, to tie the definition more closely to Resolution 
3314 and to the U.N. Charter framework governing lawful uses of force, and to preserve an 
opening for claims about the legality of humanitarian interventions and other arguably legitimate 
yet potentially unlawful uses of force.
209
 
One set of proposed understandings attempted to tether the definition of aggression and 
its interpretation more closely to certain aspects of General Assembly resolution 3314. In 
particular, the United States proposed threshold language to the effect that ―it is understood that, 
consistent with the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 3314, only the most 
serious and dangerous forms of illegal use of force are considered to constitute aggression‖210 
and ―it is only a war of aggression that is a crime against international peace.‖ 211  As an 
interpretive guide, the United States proposed language stating that ―it is understood that in 
determining whether an act is manifest, all three components of character, gravity, and scale 
must be sufficient to justify a ‗manifest‘ determination.‖212 
With a second set of understandings, the United States sought to gain acknowledgement 
that the U.N. Charter recognizes that certain uses of force remain lawful, notwithstanding Article 
2(4) of the Charter. Accordingly, one proposed understanding read:  
 
[N]othing in this resolution or the [aggression] amendments … should be 
interpreted or applied in any manner inconsistent with General Assembly 
resolution 3314, nor should they be construed as in any way enlarging or 
diminishing the scope of the Charter of the United Nations, including its 
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is unlawful.   
 
More pointedly, another proposed understanding stated:  
 
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered a 
manifest violation of the United Nations Charter absent a showing that it was 
undertaken without the consent of the relevant state, was not taken in self-defense, 
and was not within any authorization provided by the United Nations Security 
Council. 
 
 A third set of understandings attempted to carve out an exception for the doctrine of 
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 See Christian Wenaweser, Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair‟s Perspective, 23 
LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 883, 883 (2010) (noting that states parties were ―willing to address legitimate concerns outside 
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 The United States circulated a set of proposed understandings during the Review Conference that served as the 
basis for breakout negotiations chaired by Claus Kress of the University of Cologne and a member of the German 
delegation. See Proposed U.S. Understandings, on file with the author. 
210
 The Preamble of Resolution 3314 notes that ―aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use 
of force.‖ 
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 See supra note ___ [GA 3314 discussion re: war of aggression].  See also Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2526 (1970), available at 
http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm (proclaiming that a ―war of aggression 
constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law.‖).  
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 Proposed U.S. Understandings, supra note ___.  
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humanitarian intervention.  First, the United States sought recognition of the fact that ―a 
determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of all the 
circumstances of each particular case, including the purposes for which force was used and the 
gravity of the acts concerned or their consequences.‖ The reference to ―purposes‖ provided a 
potential opening to argue for the legality of humanitarian interventions.  Another proposed 
understanding drew upon the definition of ―manifest‖ from the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
213
 This proposed understanding was more explicit in addressing humanitarian 
intervention:  
 
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be 
a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be objectively 
evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal 
practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with an effort 
to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of 
the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.  
 
These proposals were repackaged into two draft understandings for consideration by 
delegates in informal negotiations.
214
 The first proposal considered, Understanding X, combined 
the reference to the most serious and dangerous uses of force and the need to consider all of the 
circumstances including the purpose for which forces was used. Understanding X proved to be 
controversial. In particular, a few states led by Iran argued that the introduction of the subjective 
element of ―purpose‖ in considering the legality of uses of force threatened to compromise the 
entire process and effectively amend the U.N. Charter by the back door. Detractors questioned 
what purposes other than self-defense were lawful under the Charter. The United States at first 
acceded to the removal of the term ―purpose,‖ but later reserved on the record the right to re-
open the question of a more explicit mention of humanitarian intervention, although it did not 
ever do so in a formal setting. Additional bilateral meetings were held, at which time consensus 
was reached on Understanding X.
215
 The second, Understanding Y, mandated the cumulative 
interpretation of the factors of character, gravity, and scale.  Eventually, the two Understandings 
appeared in the final text of the amendments
216
 as follows:  
 
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force; and that a determination whether an act of aggression has 
been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of each 
particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their 
consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. … 
7.  It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components 
of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ―manifest‖ 
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consideration and debate in a special working group session on June 9, 2010, explaining his ―minimalist‖ approach 
on the fact certain the other understandings ―met with significant reluctance.‖ 
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6 November 2003, 2003 I.C.J. 161.   
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 Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note ___, at 6.  
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determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the 
manifest standard by itself.
217
 
 
Together, the understandings make clear that any gravity determination applies at the time the 
predicate act of aggression is under consideration, not just when the charges for the crime of 
aggression are contemplated. 
It remains to be seen whether and how the adopted understandings will influence 
prosecutions before the Court in light of their uncertain legal authority.
218
 The proposed but un-
adopted understandings no doubt served some pedagogical purpose among delegations, but their 
impact on the travaux préparatoires remains ambiguous.
219
 Some delegations supported the 
content or impulse behind the rejected understandings, but deemed them unnecessary or 
superfluous; others expressed concerns as to their very content. Given this ambiguous record, it 
will be for the various organs and constituencies of the ICC—including the prosecutor exercising 
prosecutorial discretion—to determine whether to investigate future humanitarian 
interventions.
220
 By virtue of this de facto delegation of interpretive authority,
221
 the ICC is thus 
poised to play a role as arbiter on the legality of humanitarian interventions. At a minimum, the 
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generally ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 237 (2007) (discussing the validity of agreements 
relating to a treaty made at the conclusion of the negotiations). 
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 Stahn, supra note ___, at 879 (noting that the understandings were designed ―to enable the court to dismiss 
frivolous, or politically motivated allegations of aggression and to protect military missions based on self-defence, 
humanitarian intervention, or other legitimate purposes consistent with the UN Charter.‖); Roger Clark, 
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the First Review Conference on 
the Court, Kampala, 31 May-11 June 2010, 2 GÖTTINGEN J. OF INT‘L L. 689, 698 (2010) (noting that the gravity 
threshold will apply in ―a (rare) case of principled humanitarian intervention or a case more generally where the 
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 See Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT‘L L. 631, 643 (2005) 
(discussing tendency of states to delegate decision-making to international judges when consensus cannot be 
obtained). 
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equivocal record suggests that the Court should consider both potential meanings of 
―manifest‖—seriousness and legal certainty—in the aggression context.222  
One avenue for creating an opening for humanitarian interventions and other potentially 
lawful or legitimate uses of force that was not fully explored would have been to tinker with the 
mens rea element of the crime of aggression either with respect to the definition of the crime of 
aggression or even the state act of aggression.
223
 As it stands, the definition of the crime of 
aggression contains an objective intention/knowledge formulation: the defendant must intend to 
commit an enumerated act of aggression (bombardment, etc.) and must have knowledge of the 
factual circumstances that render the act a manifest violation of the Charter.
224
 The defendant 
need not, however, have knowledge of legal doctrine concerning the use of force. If drafters in 
Kampala had followed much of the Nuremberg jurisprudence
225
 and required proof of a 
heightened mental state—such as a specific intent or motive element to achieve an illegitimate 
territorial acquisition or political aim or even require some showing of bad faith, malice, 
willfulness, or hostile intent—they might have provided an additional element to enable the 
Court to avoid entering into the humanitarian intervention fray and potentially altering the debate 
through its jurisprudence.
226
 As an alternative to a mens rea element addressed to the defendant, 
the amendments could have focused on the state‘s intent in engaging in the purported act of 
aggression, bearing in mind the difficulty of attributing an ―intention‖ to an artificial entity like a 
state.
227
 This was the impulse behind the United States‘ proposal to include reference to the state 
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 Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note ___, at 1193 n.55 (noting that any use of armed force giving rise to a 
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 See Elise Leclerc-Gagné & Michael Byers, A Question of Intent: The Crime of Aggression and Unilateral 
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 In the High Command Case, adjudicated pursuant to CCL 10, the tribunal stated that the lawful or unlawful 
character of a war turns on its purpose: ―Whether a war be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under 
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unlawfulness.‖ Von Leeb, supra note __, at 486. 
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 The issue of whether some element of specific hostile intent is inherent to the crime of aggression arose in 
German legal proceedings in connection with the Kosovo intervention. The German Penal Code at Article 80 
penalizes ―crimes against the peace‖ and states: ―Whoever prepares a war of aggression … in which the Federal 
Republic of Germany is supposed to participate and thereby creates a danger of war for the Federal Republic of 
Germany, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or for not less than ten years.‖  Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) (Nov. 13, 1998) (Ger.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm. Claims 
brought under these code sections to prevent Germany‘s participation in the Kosovo intervention were rejected on 
the ground that the purpose of that intervention was to halt crimes against humanity, whereas those code sections 
were concerned with the preservation of the peace.  One commentator, later appointed a Judge of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, noted:  
 
Aggressive war was distinguished from a mere violation of the prohibition on the use of force by 
the specific intent required, namely to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples. Thus, the 
benign motives of NATO action were deemed to be sufficient to exculpate the German 
government—an argument usually not sustained under German criminal law.  
 
Andreas L. Paulus, Peace through Justice? The Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time of Crisis, 50 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2004). 
227
 See Int‘l Crim. Ct., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Discussion Paper Proposed by the 
Chairman, p. 3, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, (January 29–Feb. 1, 2007) (defining the threshold as follows: ―[An act] 
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―purpose‖ in engaging in the impugned conduct. A prior but abandoned German proposal, for 
example, would have defined an act of aggression with reference to a state policy‘s willfulness or 
hostile intent.
228
 In the alternative, the definition could have listed a series of prohibited 
purposes, such as conquest, establishing a military occupation in the victim state, launching a 
war of aggression, achieving the annexation of the other state‘s territory, acquiring the other 
state‘s material resources, undermining the political independence of the state, ousting a state 
leadership, or violating a state‘s neutrality.229 
 Another avenue to address these concerns would have been to rework the defenses to 
more clearly allow for a consideration of whether the individual or state was motivated by the 
defense of others at the time of the act of aggression. Although self-defense and the defense of 
others appear in Article 31 of the Rome Statute,
230
 these articles do not easily accommodate 
―defenses‖ that might be raised by the putative aggressor state at the stage in the proceedings at 
which the state act of aggression is under consideration.  Presumably, that the predicate state 
action was in fact a lawful use of force could be raised by the defendant at trial pursuant to 
Article 31(3), assuming the absence of conflicts of interest between the defendant and the 
aggressor state government. It is unclear procedurally, however, whether either the impugned 
state or the victim state would have standing to participate in the aggression determination by the 
Pre-Trial Division absent amendment to the Statute or Rules of Procedure.
231
 
As it stands, the only way for any party to address potentially unlawful but nonetheless 
legitimate uses of force is with reference to the tripartite factors of character, gravity, and scale. 
Drafters did not consider how these quantitative and qualitative factors should be defined or 
applied, leaving it to the Court for interpretation. Both gravity and scale seem to refer to the 
severity, magnitude, and consequences of a particular use of force. The term ―character,‖ as a 
more qualitative term, is the most elastic of the three factors and might provide an opening to 
argue that an act of aggression was not committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes. 
This, of course, presumes that these arguments are not foreclosed by the rejection of the United 
States‘ proposed understandings on humanitarian intervention.  
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2. Intervening on Behalf of Women 
 
For those of us concerned about augmenting international law‘s ability to protect women, 
should we care about over-deterring humanitarian interventions and other uses of force that do 
not rise to the level of an aggressive war or hostile attack?
232
 Many strains of feminism are 
closely tied to pacifism in rejecting the masculinist impulse to resort to arms in the face of 
conflict. This approach is alternatively based on an affirmative essentialism or premised on 
theories of differential socialization.—.233 Feminists may reject humanitarian intervention on the 
ground that resorting to armed force may limit our ability to imagine, design, and implement 
other non-violent forms of conflict resolution.
234
 There is also the symbolic concern that the idea 
of humanitarian intervention furthers a victim narrative by portraying women as in need of a 
male savior. While humanitarian interventions are ostensibly protective, they are—after all—
guarantees of more violence, at least in the short term if not longer.
235
 Such operations still 
valorize militarism and entail the use of armed force, which can cause great destruction, injure 
civilians, and destroy societies.
236
 Doing so in the name of humanitarianism or women does not 
negate the harm caused.
237
 All that said, anyone who is the innocent victim of violence deserves 
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to be rescued from her predicament, and encouraging women to exercise their autonomy and 
agency is simply folly when they are looking down the barrel of a gun.
238
 Given these 
considerations, it is unlikely that feminist thinkers will ever universally come to terms with the 
idea of a just war.
239
 
 Notwithstanding this ambivalence, many feminists have fought for a more robust 
intervention in previous conflict zones where women were at risk.
240
 These calls began anew 
when the Taliban began imposing a form of gender apartheid
241
 in Afghanistan.
242
 It was not 
until the attacks of September 11
th
, however, that the United States mobilized an intervention in 
Afghanistan, which was accused of harboring elements of Al Qaida.  At that time, the rhetoric 
surrounding the intervention appropriated feminist concerns about the plight of women under the 
target government in the service of garnering the support of domestic and international 
constituencies for the military response.
243
 Never, however, has the substantial denial of 
women‘s rights—whether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural—served as the sole or 
primary basis for a humanitarian intervention.
244
 To be sure, situations in which interventions 
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have been launched or considered involved violations of women‘s rights that might have been 
alleviated with a halt to violence or a change of regime.
245
 That said, interventions that did go 
forward have not necessarily benefited women across the board.
246
 Given this history, it is 
difficult to support a feminist vision of humanitarian intervention on behalf of women under 
contemporary conditions, when women are so often excluded from decisions about uses of 
force.
247
 Humanitarian intervention may be more palatable to feminists, and ultimately more 
beneficial to women, were women included in their design and implementation.
248
 
 
G. Ending Conflicts 
 
 In addition to enabling the prosecution of the architects of acts of aggression, the crime of 
aggression may serve another useful purpose in providing a crime for which amnesties could be 
strategically offered to exact peace from warring parties and to encourage leaders to order their 
subordinates to lay down their arms.
249
 Specifically, promising top leaders amnesty from 
potential prosecution for the crime of aggression may provide a carrot for peace talks and 
negotiations,
250
 assuming of course these individuals are not at risk of being prosecuted for other 
atrocity crimes within the Court‘s jurisdiction. In this way, the ability to charge potential 
defendants for the crime of aggression may reduce conflict not via deterrence, but more 
indirectly as a tool for negotiators once conflict has already begun. All civilians will benefit if 
such amnesties can shorten armed conflicts.  
 Although controversial, amnesties have proved to be useful in effectuating processes of 
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transitional justice in formerly repressive regimes
251
 and in demobilizing rebels in the context of 
non-international armed conflicts.
252
 As a condition of relinquishing power, the government of 
General Augusto Pinochet, for example, granted its agents an amnesty in 1978 for any acts 
committed by government agents in Chile and abroad.
253
 Likewise, the amnesty-for-truth 
tradeoff was central to the negotiated solution in South Africa that enabled the dismantling of 
apartheid.
254
 Many human rights organizations oppose the use of amnesties for grave human 
rights violations under the majority of circumstances, arguing that they further impunity and 
undercut domestic and international efforts to deter gross violations of human rights.
255
 Most, but 
not all,
256
 domestic courts that have reviewed their own amnesties have upheld their legality.
257
 
By contrast, all human rights bodies
258
 and international criminal tribunals
259
 have ruled that 
amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide violate fundamental principles of 
justice, including the right of victims to access to justice and truth before a court of law. In 
addition, other states and international tribunals are not obliged to respect amnesties awarded by 
domestic authorities.
260
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 As it stands, amnesties for the core atrocity crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes—are generally considered unlawful under international law 261  and thus are 
foreclosed as an international negotiating tactic. Most studies on the legality of amnesties do not 
include the crime of aggression within the list of non-amnestiable crimes,
262
 suggesting that this 
may be one ICC crime for which an amnesty might be employed by international negotiators and 
upheld by the ICC. Of course, this view reflects the fact that aggression has not been criminally 
charged since World War II. This apparent opinio juris may change once the crime becomes 
prosecutable before the ICC.  
 
H. Distractions and Detractions 
 
Human rights groups,
263
 international criminal law personnel,
264
 government 
representatives,
 265
 and academics
266
 have raised concerns that adding the crime of aggression at 
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justice. ... Prudently declining to adopt an amendment on aggression at this time, when the Court 
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central to combating impunity, and ensuring accountability, for the most heinous international 
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this early stage in the Court‘s life will detract time and attention from the atrocity crimes, which 
routinely go unpunished both domestically and internationally and which more directly address 
gender-based violence. Many groups fear the Court will become bogged down in trying to 
understand the causes of war—inquiries deemed outside the Court‘s current institutional 
competency
267—rather than in prosecuting war‘s consequences. Indeed, the crimes against the 
peace charge was the linchpin of the Nuremberg and Tokyo indictments and the centerpiece of 
the final judgments. Notwithstanding the enormity of the Holocaust, the majority of the 
Nuremberg judgment is devoted to condemning the aggressive acts of Germany—including the 
invasions of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Belgium—in violation of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, various bilateral treaties and assurances of non-aggression, and declarations of neutrality.
268
 
Likewise, the crimes against humanity and war crimes allegations at Tokyo received short shrift 
in the Tokyo judgment, leading to the invisibility of many crimes committed against civilians in 
general and women in particular.
269
  
Although the Court has made important advances to date (especially in flushing out its 
procedural framework), it does not yet have much to show for its eight years of existence. There 
are, as of yet, no verdicts on the merits. The trials of only three of the six defendants in custody 
are ongoing, but troubled.
 
Only a handful of defendants are in custody while others flout their 
arrest warrants. Indeed, none of the Ugandan defendants is in custody despite the fact that these 
were the first indictments issued.
270
 Further, an indictment was not confirmed in one of the 
Sudanese cases,
271
 the high level defendants are at large, the African Union came out against the 
indictment of Al Bashir
272
 (although it has been suggested that Libya hijacked the proceedings 
that generated the preliminary policy statement
273
), and aid groups find it difficult to reach those 
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in need in Darfur. The indictments themselves are of more limited scope than comparable 
indictments before the ad hoc tribunals,
274
 although almost all are commendable for their 
integration of charges of gender-based violence.
275
 This fear that the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression in its Statute will distract the Court is especially real given that the Assembly of 
States Parties has allocated no additional resources to the Court to prosecute this new, 
controversial, and qualitatively different crime. Arguably, to effectively prosecute the crime of 
aggression, the various organs of the Court will need to hire staff with appropriate experience 
and skill sets to evaluate aggression referrals and evidence.  Depending on how often the Court 
faces aggression claims, it may also be necessary to alter the mix of judges to include more 
experts in public international law at the expense of experts in criminal law and procedure, 
human rights, humanitarian law (the jus in bello), or violence against women and children.
276
   
In addition to overwhelming the Court, investigating and prosecuting the crime of 
aggression may further politicize the institution, undermining its ability to undertake its core 
mandate.
277
 One fear is that states will use their referral powers opportunistically to trigger 
investigations into inter-state grievances over territory, foreign policies, arms control, the drug 
trade, secessionist movements, and the like.
278
 The risk that states parties will manipulate the 
Court for their own ends is perhaps more acute now that delegates have decided not to allow an 
exclusive Security Council filter for state referral cases and to instead empower the Pre-Trial 
Division to approve aggression charges in the event of Security Council inaction.
279
 Even if 
indictments do not issue or the Court rejects the charges, the risk of destabilization is ever-
present.
280
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The Council‘s five permanent members—Great Britain, China, France, Russia and the 
United States—and some of their close allies had favored a system that allowed the Security 
Council to serve as a gatekeeper to any prosecution for aggression. Detractors had worried that 
such an arrangement would undermine judicial independence, render the Court a tool for the 
Security Council, and lead to unequal justice.
281
 At the same time, the Council might have been 
in a better position than the Pre-Trial Division to ferret out abusive or fallacious claims that are 
more likely to exacerbate international tensions than alleviate them. Indeed, externalizing the 
filter process to the Council may have actually decreased actual or potential politicization by 
allowing the Court to focus on the attribution of individual criminal liability rather than inserting 
it into political disputes that may give rise to the perception of bias.   
V. Conclusion  
 
Notwithstanding this hyper-visibility in the post-WWII period, crimes against the peace 
all but disappeared from the international criminal law pantheon in the Cold War period. The 
international community is now poised to recommit to prosecuting the crime, thus completing 
the Nuremberg legacy and fully adapting the Nuremberg Principles to the modern era.
282
 If we 
care about what happens to women in war, we should do everything in our power to decrease the 
incidence of war in the first place. It is too early to tell whether the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute will be able to do this. Indeed, this Article has reached no firm 
conclusion on how feminists should think about whether the newly codified crime of aggression 
will improve the lives of women. Both the definition of the crime and the jurisdictional regime 
contain elements that may be helpful, neutral, or even harmful to the interests of women.   
Certainly prosecuting the crime of aggression is not the only, or even best, way to 
decrease inter-state violence. But, it is the path that the international community is now on.
283
 
Once again, we find ourselves asking the ―woman question‖ in a reactive posture 284  and 
engaging in a continuing task of determining how legal doctrines and frameworks—which 
women played little hand in generating—affect women. Although at this early stage I am left 
holding contradictory thoughts about the utility of codifying the crime of aggression, at a 
minimum, a number of pitfalls to incorporating the aggression amendments into the Rome 
Statute are already visible. These should be kept on the forefront of our minds and conversations 
as this crime is operationalized and a procedural regime is developed for its prosecution. Since 
this is a path that the international community is on, we should endeavor to make sure it goes in 
the right direction. Moreover, we should not lose sight of alternative solutions to ending violence 
as we imagine a more peaceful world. The world‘s women deserve nothing less.  
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